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Summary 
This paper focuses on FET standard from the perspective of the host state. 
Assuming that the FET standard is problematic and too investor friendly, the 
question is how the FET standard may be limited in favor of the host state 
without the investor losing an unreasonable amount of protection. In search 
of the answers to this question, the paper focuses on the content and 
components of the FET standard as well as the issue that the many different 
formulations of the FET standard prevents a coherent system. After a review 
of the content and the substantive difference between different FET 
formulations the conclusion found in this paper is that the most problematic 
aspect of the FET standard is the doctrine of legitimate expectations. A 
solution to this might lay in the different FET formulations, as the different 
formulations provides different interpretations of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations. The formulation of the FET standard in the recently negotiated 
CETA is briefly mentioned and discussed as a possible solution to the 
problem, but not entirely without flaws.  
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats är fokuserad på FET-standarden från värdlandets perspektiv. 
Uppsatsen förutsätter att FET-standarden är problematisk på så vis att den 
gynnar utländska investerare för mycket på värdlandets bekostnad. Frågan 
är hur FET-standarden kan begränsas till förmån för värdlandet utan att 
investeraren förlorar sitt skydd. För att besvara denna fråga undersöker 
uppsatsen FET-standardens innehåll och olika komponenter. Den tittar även 
på hur olika formuleringar av standarden skiljer sig åt och om detta 
försvårar en konsekvent tillämpning av standarden. Efter en genomgång av 
FET-standardens innehåll och avgörande skillnader mellan olika FET 
formuleringar, kommer uppsatsen fram till att en av de mest problematiska 
aspekterna med standarden är doktrinen om ”legitimate expectations”. En 
lösning på detta problem kan finnas i de olika FET formuleringarna som 
finns, eftersom doktrinen i vissa av dessa tolkas på ett sätt som är mer 
gynnsamt för värdlandet.  Formuleringen av FET-standarden i det nyligen 
framförhandlade investeringsavtalet CETA nämns och diskuteras som en 
möjlig lösning på problemet men inte helt utan brister.  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Abbreviations 
BIT    Bilateral Investment Treaty 
CAFTA-DR   Dominican Republic - Central American 
     Free Trade Agreement 
CETA    EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
     Trade Agreement 
FET    Fair and Equitable Treatment 
FCN Treaties    Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
     Treaties 
ICCPR    International Covenant on Civil and  
     Political Rights 
ICJ    International Court of Justice 
ICSID Convention  International Centre of Settlement of  
     Investment Disputes Convention 
IIA    International Investment Agreement  
MST    Minimum Standard of Treatment /  
     International Minimum Standard  
NAFTA    North American Free Trade Agreement 
OECD    The Organization for Economic  
     Co-operation and Development  
SICJ    Statue of the International Court of Justice 
UNCTAD    United Nations Conference on Trade and 
     Development 
VCLT    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) can be a source of controversy, as there has been some 
debate as whether it is reasonable for a state to sign them at all. Some 
authors argue that there is nothing for the host state to be gained from 
signing them, yet at the same time they risk being sued through investor-
state arbitration for millions of dollars.  This paper will not engage in this 1
debate, instead I have assumed that there is something to be gained from 
signing IIAs and BITs for the state, and that promoting foreign investment 
can be a way to create jobs and favorable conditions for the host state.  
But even if we assume that IIAs and BITs in general are beneficial for the 
state that sign them, there is still a fear that the treaties are too investor 
friendly at the cost of the host state. One of the most common investor 
claims is that the host state has breached the fair and equitable treatment 
(FET) standard, a general treatment clause commonly found in IIAs and 
BITs which also is the claim with the best success rate. There is a fear that 
fair and equitable treatment is too generous for the investor and that it 
hinders the host state actions too much. Whether this is the case or not is to 
a certain degree a matter of politics, as it depends on whether one would 
prefer a power balance in favor of the state or private corporations. 
In 2012 the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) published a study with the name Fair and Equitable Treatment - 
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, in which several 
cases from tribunals all over the world were discussed and analyzed in 
regards to the fair and equitable treatment standard. This treatment standard 
entails that the host state must behave in a certain way towards investors 
from another contracting state. Thus the investor is guaranteed a certain 
 Van Harten, Guz. Five Justifications For Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion. Trade, Law and 1
Development, Vol II:19 (Spring 2010). pp. 28-35. 
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level of treatment, which encourages the investor to invest in the host 
country.  
The problem with the FET standard, which also was one of the reasons to 
conclude the above mentioned study, is that it is vague and imprecise. This 
results in that the arbitrators in an investor-state dispute may interpret the 
clause differently from case to case, and in the worst case scenario the 
application of the standard may appear arbitrary. As it stands today, critics 
against the international investment law regime claim that the FET standard 
has evolved into a treatment standard which favors the investors and 
impedes the contracting states legislative powers in a way not initially 
intended and, in a democratic state, not wanted.   2
  
1.2 Purpose and research questions 
In this paper I have assumed that the FET standard, as it stands today, 
imposes too much constraint on the host state’s actions. I believe that too 
investor friendly treaties may hinder the development of the host state, 
affecting its possibilities of introducing, among others, new environmental 
regulations, changes in its fiscal regulations and other policies which may 
affect the investor negatively. This means that I think that the rights of the 
investors should be limited in favor of the host country. There are major 
problems with the FET standard. Its content is not clear, and this makes the 
application of the standard unpredictable, and in the worst case scenario it is 
applied arbitrarily. This issue is further enhanced by the fact that there exist 
several different formulations of the FET, which creates uncertainties on 
whether there exist different kinds of FET standards and how they differ in 
relation to each other. 
The FET standard is an umbrella type of clause, which includes prohibition 
on different types of host state conduct. The FET regulates the relationship 
between the investor and the host state, focusing on the host state’s actions 
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series on 2
Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 2. 
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against the investor. As such, there are several components to the FET, 
several different kinds of prohibitions. In this paper I will examine each of 
these different components, and in the final chapter analyze if they impose 
unreasonable restrictions on the host state actions.  
Further, I will discuss the different types of FET and how they differ. There 
are signs that the different types of FET are converging, which will also be a 
subject of this paper. If the different types of FET are converging, this could 
very well be a good thing as this would promote a coherent system. But if 
they are converging, one needs to understand towards which direction. One 
FET formulation seems intended to be more narrow (limits the rights of the 
investor in relation to the host state) than other formulations, so one 
question of interest is if this means that this formulation is becoming wider, 
or if the others are becoming more narrow?    
The FET formulation I have in mind is the one which links the FET to the 
minimum standard of treatment in accordance with the customary 
international law (MST). This FET formulation, which appears in this paper 
due to its existence in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the Dominican Republic - Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR), has been interpreted to equal the MST standard. But despite 
that it is clear from the IIA that this is the way the FET formulation in the 
treaty is to be applied, scholars agree on that it is unsure whether the FET 
linked to the MST has the same content and application as the MST in 
accordance with international customary law. This paper will focus on the 
relation between the different FET formulations, and not on the relationship 
between FET and the MST outside of the context of international investment 
agreements.  
The questions I aim to answer in this paper are the following:  
1. Which are the problematic aspects or components of the FET standard, 
and what can be done to limit their scope in favor of the host state but 
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still provide good enough protection for investors as to promote foreign 
investment? 
2. How do the different FET formulations relate to each other and are they 
converging? If they are converging, in which direction?     
1.3 Method 
In this paper I will utilize the method of legal dogmatics, a method one can 
describe as interpreting the defined sources of law as a means to analyze and 
solve issues relating to the applicable legal framework.  In domestic law, the 3
sources of law are usually the written laws, any relevant governmental 
documents in regards of those laws (such as the preparatory works) and the 
practice of the courts in the country. In regards to international law, it is 
usually considered that the Article 38 in the Statue of the International Court 
of Justice (SICJ) itself is considered a rule of international law and thus 
applicable even outside of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  The 4
articles reads as follows: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.  
This means that we have three main sources of law, which are all relevant 
for this paper. The main focus will be on rules originating from treaties (a) 
since the focus on this paper will be on the interpretation of treaties and on 
 Korling, Fredric and Zamboni, Mauro (eds.). Juridisk metodlära. Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2013.  pp. 21.3
 Linderfalk, Ulf (eds.). Folkrätten i ett nötskal. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012. pp. 26-27.4
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awards from investor-state arbitration (which is not possible without a 
treaty). But when interpreting treaty provisions, rules originating from other 
sources of international law will become relevant.  
To prove the establishment of an international customary rule one must 
prove that states follow this rule because of a sense of legal obligation, a so 
called opinio juris. Within the international investment regime investor-state 
arbitration has played an important role in developing the FET standard, 
even though awards have no binding precedent. But since past awards have 
a great influence on the FET standard they are here treated as a source of 
law within the international investment law regime, a regime in which 
international treaty constitute the main body of law.  5
This study is to some extent depending on the above mentioned UNCTAD 
study. In this study most, if not all, awards up until 2013 were examined to 
give a detailed view of the issues and problems with the FET standard. As to 
not simply re-state or control all of the findings in this study, I will base my 
examination of awards not included in this study. As such, I will look at 
awards which were published between 2013-2015 and examine: 
1. which components the arbitrators believe to be part of the FET standard 
and if there are any issues with the components which become apparent 
through the Tribunal’s interpretation, 
2. how the wording of the standard affect which components it entails and 
which level of treatment the host state needs to uphold, and 
3. if there is any evidence in the recent cases of the different FET 
standards converging.     
As a basis for this paper I have used the database available at italaw.com, 
the same databased used in the UNCTAD study. A search of all available 
awards for respective year yielded the following results: 
 Linderfalk, 2012, pp. 28-30. 5
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This amounts to a total of 96 awards between the years 2013 and 2015. 
From this number the following awards have been excluded: 
1. All awards which only concern jurisdiction or in which the Tribunal 
found that they lacked jurisdiction. 
2. All awards which only regard the quantum. 
3. All awards in which the Tribunal does not try the FET-claim. (For 
example if the Claimant been successful in another claim which makes 
it unnecessary for the Tribunal to try the FET-claim.) 
4. All awards in another language than English. 
5. All awards based on an IIA or BIT which have not been translated to 
English.  
This leaves us with a number of fourteen awards where the FET standard 
has been analyzed by the Tribunals, whereas five are from 2013, six from 
2014 and three from 2015.  
1.4 Material and Literature 
The main material of this paper is the cases examined. To find investor-state 
arbitration awards I have used the database available at italaw.com. 
Investor-state arbitration awards have historically been rather hard to find, 
since many of the awards are not made public. In the last years it seems as 
there has been a trend of making the investor-state arbitration process more 
transparent, and as a part of that goal more and more awards are made freely 
available. A search for all awards published between the years 2013-2015 
yielded 96 cases, and these have been the basis for my examination. After 
the elimination process described above, only fourteen relevant cases 
remained.  
Year 2013 2014 2015
Number of cases 39 32 25
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Other than cases this paper also relies on the  portrayal of the FET done by 
Salacuse in his book The Law of Investment Treaties. Another prominent 
book is Rudolf Dolzer’s and Christoph Schreuer's Principles of 
international investment law. This paper includes an overview of the 
international investment regime with the main content of these chapters 
originating from established literature. But the main focus of this paper is on 
the examination of the cases and what one can learn from them regarding 
the content and evolution of the FET standard.  
1.5 Disposition  
This paper begins with presenting an overview of important and basic 
concepts relevant for this paper in Chapter 2. The focus of this part of the 
paper is on the interpretation of treaties as well as the role of past awards 
from investor-state arbitration in the international investment regime. In 
Chapter 3 the analysis of the FET standard begins with a presentation of 
different FET formulations, followed by the different components of the 
FET. In this chapter there will be references to the cases examined when 
these are relevant for the component, and an understanding of the different 
components are important to have when we in the final chapter of the paper 
discuss the problems with the FET standard. Chapter 4 is focused on the 
differences and similarities of the different FET formulations. This is an 
important aspect of the criticism that the FET standard is vague, since 
seemingly similar treaty terms may be applied differently and also vice 
versa; namely that seemingly different treaty terms may be applied in the 
same way.  Chapter 5 is the final chapter, in which I will discuss what I 
found to be the main problems with the standard as well as a summary of 
the evidence found among the cases examined on whether they are 
converging or not.  
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2 Basic concepts within the 
international investment law regime 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will present some of the basic concepts one needs to know 
and consider when examining investor-state arbitration awards. Firstly I will 
present the rules for the interpretation of treaties, since what this paper will 
focus on is how the arbitrators have interpreted the FET standard. Secondly, 
I will shortly discuss the role of past awards within international investment 
regime. As this paper uses past awards to define the content of the FET 
standard one needs to address the lack of binding precedent in the regime. 
Lastly, this chapter will present an overview of the FET standard and the 
MST standard, before we go into the substantive content of the FET 
standard in the next chapter.     
2.2 The interpretation of treaties 
A major part of the body of law within the international investment regime 
originates from treaties, either in the form of IIAs or BITs. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is applicable when interpreting 
treaties, and in article 31, article 32 and article 33 the basic rules of 
interpretation is set out.  The general rules of interpretation are explained in 6
article 31, which states that a treaty shall be interpreted "in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in light of its object and purpose". As such the article present us with 
three elements one must consider: (1) the ordinary meaning of the terms, (2) 
the context of the treaty terms and (3) the treaty's objective and purpose.  
 The interpretations rules in VCLT are generally considered to be international customary law and thus 6
binding even if the host state has not signed the convention. See Evans, Malcom (eds.) International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. pp. 193-197.
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If one finds that a treaty text is still ambiguous or unclear after one has 
considered the three elements mentioned above one can turn to article 32 of 
the VCLT. 
In regards to the FET standard, some of these rules in the VCLT provide 
little to no guidance. If one is to begin with looking at the ordinary 
meanings of the words "fair" and "equitable", one would simply find other 
terms which are equally vague. One can hardly provide a comprehensive 
definition of the FET using this method, which has been noted by the 
Tribunal in Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic.  In regards to the 7
FET standard one is more likely to find guidance when one goes to the next 
steps mentioned above: (2) the context of the treaty terms and (3) the treaty's 
objective and purpose.  
According to article 31 (2) of VCLT the context for the purpose of  the 
interpretation consists of the following: (1) the treaty text, (2) preambles and 
annexes, (3) "any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between 
all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty" and (4) "any 
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty". This makes it possible to use, for example, diplomatic 
correspondence relating to the treaty between contracting states when 
interpreting the treaty.  8
When interpreting the FET standard it is not uncommon for the Tribunal to 
look at the context of the term as well as the treaty's objective and purpose.  9
In most investment treaties, whether they are IIAs or BITs, the objective and 
purpose can be discerned early on in the document, often in the preamble. 
The purpose with investment treaties is usually to promote investment, and 
 Saluka Investments B.V. versus The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Rules, Award, 17 March 2006, para. 297. 7
 Salacuse, Jeswald. The Law of Investment Treaties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 147.8
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 147.9
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this purpose could be used as an argument to interpret the FET standard 
extensively, in favor of the investors. That a balance between the opposing 
interests of the investor and the host state must be considered when 
interpreting the FET has been noted by, among others, the Tribunal in 
Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic.  10
It is required by article 31 (3) of the VCLT that any "subsequent practice" or 
"subsequent agreement" is to be taken into account when interpreting the 
treaty.  An example of this are the interpretations notes regarding certain 11
provisions in NAFTA. In NAFTA there is a clear link between the FET 
standard and the minimal treatment standard in accordance with customary 
international law. This link were interpreted by arbitrators in a way not 
intended by the signatory states, and as such NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission issued the Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
provisions, explaining how to interpret this link between the two standards. 
In the interpretations notes it is made clear that the FET standard is 
restricted by the MST.  12
In accordance with article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT, treaty interpretation must 
also take into account ”[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable to 
the relation between the parties". This means that the arbitrators may turn to 
international law for the definition of a certain term. For example, if the case 
revolves around the term "expropriation" but the treaty lacks a definition of 
this, the arbitrator may turn to international law for guidance. Note that 
VCLT makes it clear in article 31 (4) that if a special meaning of a certain 
term were intended, this one gains primacy over of the one established 
through international law.  Further, one must beware of interpreting a treaty 
in accordance with international law as the parties might have intended to 
 Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic, para. 300. 10
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 148.11
 See NAFTA Article 1105 and the Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions  12
issued on July 31, 2001 by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission.
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exclude certain elements of international law from the relationship between 
the parties.   13
NAFTA has linked the FET standard to the MST standard, which is a 
standard developed through the means of international customary law. As 
such, one must turn to international law to gain insight of what the MST 
standard entails, something one must consider if one is to interpret the FET 
standard as it is formulated in NAFTA.  
The two other articles in the VCLT regarding interpretation are article 32 
and article 33. Article 32 permits that if one finds the meaning vague or 
ambiguous even after applying the rules in article 31, one may turn to 
supplementary sources for guidance, for example any preparatory works of 
the treaty. But when it comes to investment treaties in general, negotiating 
history and preparatory works are very scant and hard to come by.  As 14
such, this means of interpretation is not very useful when discerning the 
scope and components of the FET standard.  
Lastly, article 33 is applicable when dealing with treaties in more than one 
official language. It states that all official or authenticated texts are equally 
authoritative unless the parties agreed otherwise and that if there is a 
difference between the versions they shall be reconciled in such a way that 
is best suited to accommodate the treaty's object and purpose. 
2.3 The role of past awards within the international 
investment regime  
This paper will rely on past awards during its examination of the FET 
standard, and as such it is very important to consider that international 
investment law has no doctrine of binding precedent, which means that 
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 150-151.13
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 154.14
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future awards are not bound by past awards.  This has even been made 15
clear in international treaties such as the Statue of the International Court of 
Justice (SICJ) and the international investment agreement NAFTA.  The 16
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention 
(ICSID Convention) includes neither a prohibition of this kind nor any 
explicit evidence that investment awards constitute binding precedent.  17
But from this one must not draw the conclusion that past awards lack 
relevance for future awards. Article 38 (d) of the SICJ recognizes "judicial 
decisions [...] as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law", 
meaning that arbitrators may refer to past awards in their argumentation 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty. In the investment law regime, this 
has become rather common practice, most likely due to vague and general 
terms often used in investment treaties and the fact that many of these vague 
terms (as the FET standard) are commonly used in different treaties. Since 
one of the recognized goals of international investment law is to provide a 
stabile and predictable framework for investors, arbitrators strive to achieve 
some continuity within the regime.  18
  
2.4 Fair and equitable treatment  
The fair and equitable treatment standard has been around for quite some 
time and it is a very popular element of modern day BITs and IIAs. The first 
mention of the standard was in the Havana Charter of 1948, a legal 
document which never came into force. Several attempts followed in which 
different parties tried to include the standard in different conventions, and 
the first country to successfully incorporate the standard in its treaty practice 
was the United States which included the standard in its Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties. It did not take long until 
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 155.15
 See SICJ Article 59 and NAFTA Article 1136 (1).16
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 155.17
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 155-156. 18
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European countries started incorporating the standard into their BITs, and 
between the 1960s and the 1990s the standard was incorporated into over 
300 BITs.   Today, the standard can be found in “virtually all”  investment 19 20
agreements, and in the year 2012 there existed over 3000 investment 
agreements (including both BITs and IIAs).  As such, the standard is 21
undoubtedly very important for the international investment regime.   
The FET standard is an absolute standard, in contrast to a relative standard. 
In this context, that means that the FET standard prescribes an absolute and 
objective minimum standard of treatment that the host state must uphold in 
relation to the foreign investor. This differs from the relative standards, 
which compare the treatment of the investor with another subject, such as 
national investors or foreign investors from other countries. Examples of 
relative standards is the most favored nation treatment and the national 
treatment standard, which means that the foreign investor is to be treated 
equally with other foreign investors and domestic investors respectably. If 
we use the national treatment standard as an example, this might not provide 
adequate protection in the eyes of the investor if the domestic investors 
themselves are treated poorly. This is one of the advantages of the FET 
standard from the perspective of the foreign investor: according to the FET 
standard the host state has an obligation to grant the foreign investor a 
minimum level of protection, which means that in some cases the host state 
might have an obligation to treat foreign investors more favorably than their 
domestic counterparts.  This was an idea which at its inception met quite 22
the resistance from states as well as academics.  But determining what this 23
minimum level of protection in fact entails is not an easy task. 
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 218-220.19
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 218. 20
 Paparinskis, Martins. The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment. Oxford: 21
Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013. p. 3. 
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 220-221.22
 Evans, 2014, pp. 312-313.23
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As mentioned earlier, when interpreting the standard one often begins with 
looking at the ordinary meaning of the words. At this point in the 
interpretation process, one may ask if one is in fact dealing with two 
standards, namely (i) ”fair” and (ii) ”equitable”. But Tribunals and legal 
doctrine are clear on this subject, namely that the two terms are to be 
interpreted as one common standard. One reason for this interpretation is 
that the two terms are so similar to each other that they could not have 
different substantive content. It has also been argued that in treaties where 
the term ”fair” has been omitted, one might be able to interpret just 
”equitable” in the same way as the FET standard.   24
The FET standard has been interpreted in two ways; either it is (i) 
autonomous and standalone from the MST or (ii) it is equal to the MST. The 
MST itself has an unclear meaning. In terms of international investment law, 
the MST has been interpreted frequently by Tribunals settling disputes under 
NAFTA. In NAFTA, the FET is linked to the MST and the parties have 
made it clear by adding an annex to NAFTA which explicitly states that FET 
in the treaty equals MST, and that FET adds no substantive content to MST. 
As such, when tribunals decide a case based on the FET standard in 
NAFTA, they are deciding a case based on the MST. But the problem with 
this is that it is not sure that the practice developed within NAFTA can be 
applied outside of that context. This means that even though we have access 
to awards regarding the MST within the investment regime, it is unsure 
whether it is possible to draw any conclusion from them when defining the 
content of the MST. 
As the definition of the MST is relevant for the definition of the FET, 
especially concerning certain formulations of the FET, the next section 
presents an overview of the content of the international minimum standard 
of treatment.  
 Dolzer, 2008, p. 123. 24
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2.5 International minimum standard of treatment  
The MST is a set of norms in international customary law which governs the 
state’s relation towards foreigners. It is a broad concept and it is unclear 
exactly what it entails, but it is certain that one of its key elements is the 
doctrine of denial of justice.  An OECD report of 2004 further concluded 25
that the standard also covers the treatment of aliens under detention and the 
doctrine of full protection and security.   26
When interpreting the international minimum standard of treatment the 
process is fairly different from that of the FET standard. In the case of FET, 
one begins in the treaty and the applicable rules from VCLT. In regards to 
the MST one must apply the conventional way of establishing international 
customary rules. As such one needs to find that States follow a rule or norm 
because of a sense of legal obligation, an oponio juris. The burden of proof 
is on the Claimant, and proving an oponio juris can be a daunting task.  27
One of the most cited cases in regards to the MST is the Neer  case from 28
1926. In this case, the U.S. brought a claim against Mexico alleging that 
Mexico, due to failing in finding and prosecuting a murderer of a U.S. 
national, had failed to exercise due diligence and committed a denial of 
justice. The Mexico-United States General Claims Commission which tried 
the case set a high threshold, stating that the treatment had to “amount to an 
outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of 
governmental action so far short of international standards that every 
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 25
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 45.
 OECD. Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law. OECD Working Papers 26
on International Investment, 2004/03, OECD Publishing, 2004. p. 9, para 34.
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 27
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. pp. 44-45.
 LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (United States v. Mexico), General Claims Commission, Opinion, 15 October 28
1926.
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reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.”  29
Mexico had not failed to uphold the MST.  
But despite being one of the most cited cases, its influence today is 
debatable. Especially within the international investment regime the Neer 
case seems to have lost some of its relevance, with Tribunals arguing that 
the MST has evolved since 1926. In regards to the argument that the MST 
has changed there are two different views of its evolution: either (i) the MST 
in itself has changed and the threshold is no longer as high so as to 
constitute an “outrage”, or (ii) that what is to be consider an “outrage” today 
is something different from what would be considered an “outrage” in 1926. 
Among my cases, only the first (i) viewpoint is supported, and it seems as 
though the second (ii) viewpoint is losing, or have already lost, most of its 
support.   30
 LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (United States v. Mexico), General Claims Commission, Opinion, 15 October 29
1926. para. 4. 
 The Tribunals reasoning in Gold Reserve Inc. versus Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 30
ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, 22 September 2014, seems to support the first (i) viewpoint, see para. 567. The 
Tribunal in Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, UNCITRAL Rules, Award, 8 June 2009, para. 22 supports the 
second viewpoint. The Tribunal in Clayton v. Canada supports the first (i) viewpoint and claims that the 
viewpoint articulated in Glamis Gold v. United States is losing support, para. 434.  
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3 The substantive content of the fair 
and equitable treatment  
3.1 Introduction 
The main focus of this chapter is the substantive content of the fair and 
equitable treatment which will be defined through a list of prohibitions of 
host state conduct. But before we delve into that subject we need to discuss 
the different FET formulations found among the IIAs and BITs examined in 
this paper. The existence of these different formulations of FET is 
something one must consider, as the components of the FET might differ 
depending on the FET formulations. Therefore this chapter begins with a 
discussion regarding different formulations on the FET standard, followed 
by a discussion of the substantive content of the FET. In the next chapter, 
we will have a closer look at how the different formulations differ and 
whether some of the formulations are converging.  
3.2 The different FET formulations  
The FET standard is found in many IIAs and BITs throughout the world, 
and as such it is not strange that the exact formulation of FET differs from 
treaty to treaty. The question that arises from this fact is whether this means 
that the interpretation and application of the standard also differs from treaty 
to treaty. In this section I will present the different categories of the FET 
used in the UNCTAD study and the corresponding categories used in this 
paper.  
The UNCTAD study differs between the following different FET 
formulations:  
1. FET without any references to international law or any further criteria 
(unqualified FET) 
2. FET linked to international law 
3. FET linked to the minimum standard of treatment of aliens under 
international customary law 
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4. FET with additional substantive content (denial of justice, unreasonable/
discriminatory measures, breach of other treaty obligations, accounting 
for the level of development).   31
Of the cases examined all of these different formulations have been 
accounted for, see Supplement B for a list of all cases and applicable FETs.   
In the cases examined I have found no apparent difference in how the 
Tribunals treat formulation 1 and 4. At times, the Tribunal has made an extra 
comment regarding certain claims, for example in Minnotte and Lewis v. 
Poland  the Tribunal concluded that there had not been any breach of the 32
FET nor the prohibition of discriminatory measures, a prohibition which 
traditionally is thought to be a part of the FET claim.  But besides this the 33
additional substantive content does not add anything of interest to the FET 
claim since the additional content in all of the examined cases were part of 
the FET anyway. The Tribunal in British Caribbean Bank v. Belize  also 34
made their opinion on this matter clear when they chose to only reveal the 
very beginning of the relevant FET article when they were citing relevant 
articles from the BIT. The parts in the BIT regarding the additional 
substantive content were left out, cutting the article in mid-sentence.  For 35
these reasons, I have excluded this category in its entirety and included 
these cases in the same category as the unqualified FETs.  
In regards to the formulation number 2 used in the UNCTAD study, this 
includes two different ways of linking the FET to international law. First, we 
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 31
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. pp. 17-38.
 David Minnotte and Robert Lewis versus Republic of Poland, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/10/1, Award, 16 32
May 2014. As one can see in the Supplement C, I have not categorized the applicable FET as a FET with 
additional content because it has a link to international law and the additional content is not in the same 
sentence as the FET. The additional content can be found in the same article. 
 Minnotte and Lewis v. Poland, para. 202.33
 British Caribbean Bank Limited (Turks & Caicos) versus The Government of Belize, PCA CASE No 34
2010-18, Award, 19 December 2014.
 British Caribbean Bank v. Belize, para. 268. 35
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have the formulation that states that the FET shall provide protection which 
shall be no less than required by international law. Among my cases this  has 
been interpreted in the same way as an unqualified FET, and the UNCTAD 
study mentions the similarity between the two formulations.  Therefore I 36
have decided to put these cases in the same category as the unqualified FET.  
The other FET formulation in this category states that the FET should be in 
accordance with principles of international law. This type is highly relevant 
as according to the UNCTAD study this could be interpreted as linking the 
FET to the MST, since customary international law is a part of the principles 
of international law.   37
In the UNCTAD study different categories have been used based mainly on 
the wording of the FET. This approach will to some extent be abandoned 
here and instead I categorizes the FETs after their different substantive 
content. For more on how cases has been categorized, see Supplement C 
which includes a table of how my categories are different from the ones 
used in the UNCTAD study and how the cases examined in this paper have 
been categorized. To compare this list with the wording of the FET in the 
treaties, see Supplement B. This paper will use and discuss the following 
three FET formulations: 
1. Unqualified FET 
2. FET in accordance with principles of international law 
3. FET linked to the minimum standard of treatment 
This distinction between the different FET formulations is important to 
consider and one ought to have this in mind as we begin our discussion of 
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 36
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 23 and see Minnotte and Lewis v. Poland. 
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 37
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. pp. 22-23.
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the substantive content of the FET, since the content of the FET differ 
depending on its formulation.  
As already mentioned in the above section on interpretation, interpreting the 
FET standard usually begins with discerning the ordinary meaning of the 
words “fair” and “equitable”, in line with the rules of interpretations laid out 
in the VCLT. But since it is so hard to determine the content of the FET 
through the use of the rules in the VCLT, arbitral awards have become 
exceedingly important in determining the content of the standard. By 
examining past awards one has been able to ascertain host state conduct 
which are in breach of the FET standard, namely: 
1. conduct which fail to protect the investor’s legitimate expectations, 
2. conduct which is inconsistent or lacks transparency, 
3. arbitrary or discriminatory conduct, 
4. harassment, 
5. denial of justice or due process and 
6. host state actions committed in bad faith.    38
All of the above are what I in this paper call the different elements or 
components of the FET standard. One problem with these different 
components is that at times it can be hard to separate them from each other, 
for example the host states requirement to act transparently is closely tied to 
the doctrine of legitimate expectations. 
Note that it is not necessary for one action in itself to breach the standard, as 
in the concept of “treatment” tribunals have found that this includes many 
actions taken over a period of time. This means that even if one action in 
itself was not enough to breach the standard, all of the actions taken as a 
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 230. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable 38
Treatment - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012, pp. 61-88 and 
Dumberry, 2014, p. 50. 
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whole can together amount to a breach.  This also means that it can be hard 39
to determine exactly which component of the FET the Tribunals finds most 
important in the current case. For example in Clayton v. Canada the 
Tribunals discusses a breach of the FET both in terms of lack of 
transparency and failure to uphold the investors legitimate expectations.   40
In the following we will have a look at the different components of the FET 
standard, with each sub-heading corresponding to one of the six components 
listed above. 
3.3 Legitimate expectations 
This component of the FET standard was applied in a majority of the cases 
examined in this essay, and I would say it is one of the most central but also 
one of the most problematic aspects of the standard.  The concept, or 41
doctrine, of the investors legitimate expectations evolves around changes 
which occur after the investor has made their investments which effects the 
investment in a negative way. Changes in general can be of very different 
nature; the price of oil may change drastically which may make an 
investment no longer profitable, or the host state may change its legislation 
or deny a renewal of a permit which will have negative consequences for the 
investment. Changes not attributable to the host state, such as price changes 
due to supply and demand or natural disasters, are outside the scope of the 
legitimate expectations doctrine. Instead, the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations focuses on changes attributable to the host state actions.     42
The reason behind this principle is that making an investment in a foreign 
country often involves a big commitment for the investor. The investment 
 This has been made clear by many awards, see for example The Rompetrol Group N.V. versus Romania, 39
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, 6 May 2013. para. 198. 
 Clayton v. Canada, para. 594. 40
 In twelve of the fourteen cases the legitimate expectations doctrine were discussed by the Tribunal as a 41
part of the FET standard.  
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 42
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. pp. 63-64. 
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might be planned to continue for a long time or maybe even indefinitely, as 
such one does not want the host state to lure foreign investor with, for 
example, lucrative tax exemptions only to remove these exemptions once 
the investment has been made. Many arbitral tribunals have found that it is 
unfair if a host state create certain expectations through their laws and 
actions if the state later on takes subsequent actions which fundamentally 
deny these expectations.  43
The doctrine includes several limitations, so as not to have the unwanted 
consequence that the host state is required to freeze its legal state. If the host 
state alters its environmental law or labour regulations in a way which is 
disadvantageous for the investor this should in most cases not constitute a 
breach of the doctrine. Rather, it is applicable in cases were the host state 
has been clear that certain investor friendly laws will be in force for a 
certain amount of time but then revoked them too early (as in Micula and 
others v. Romania ).  44 45
It is also important to note that the role of the legitimate expectations 
doctrine might be different depending on the FET formulation. The 
difference is that among the unqualified FETs, the doctrine is a standalone 
component of the FET and as such a Claimant may claim a breach of the 
investors legitimate expectations and thus establish a breach of the FET. But 
this might not be the case if the FET is linked to the international minimum 
standard as it is in the NAFTA treaty. Instead, the doctrine of the investors 
legitimate expectations is considered when establishing a breach of another 
standalone component of the FET, such as the prohibition against 
discriminatory or arbitrary actions.   46
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 231.43
 Oan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. 44
versus Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, 11 December 2013.
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 233.45
 Dumberry, 2014. pp. 58-62. 46
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In determining whether there has been a breach of the doctrine, tribunals 
focus on whether the expectations created were reasonable and justifiable. 
As such not every statement from a government official will amount to 
create legitimate exceptions for the investor. If an investor receives a 
positive statement from a governmental institution this might not be enough 
to create legitimate expectations if the statement is unclear or if it is 
contradictory to other facts or statements. Many of the cases regarding the 
legitimate expectations doctrine concerns permissions, licenses and 
regulatory framework which changed after the investment was made.  47
It is very important for the investor to establish that their expectations were 
reasonable and justified, and how the Tribunals determine if the 
expectations are reasonable is also something which might differ depending 
on the FET formulation. For the expectations to be considered reasonable 
and justified when dealing with a FET linked to the international minimum 
standard, the investor must be able to point to specific representations from 
a governmental agency with the correct authority as a basis for its 
expectations. This is to be distinguished from Tribunals deciding cases 
based on an unqualified FET, where the current legislation in the country 
might be enough to create legitimate expectations for the investor.  48
In Gold Reserve v. Venezuela  the Tribunal made a statement regarding the 49
doctrines standing within international law. The FET formulations in the 
award was a FET in accordance with principles of international law. 
International law includes but is not limited to the international minimum 
standard.  This case is unique among the cases examined here since it 50
regards a FET formulation only used in two of the cases, and unfortunately 
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 233.47
 Dumberry, 2014, pp. 66-69.  48
 Gold Reserve Inc. versus Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, 22 49
September 2014.
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 50
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 22.  
! /!29 87
in the other case with the same formulation the Tribunal did not elaborate 
much on the content of the FET.  
Due to the FET formulation applicable in Gold Reserve v. Venezuela it is not 
strange that the Tribunal turned to international law in its discussion of the 
content of the FET. But even though the FET used in this case has a more 
unusual formulation, this does not mean that the conclusion reached in this 
award is not applicable in regards to other formulations of the FET standard. 
In its reasoning to apply international law on the present case the Tribunal 
made a reference to Article 54 of the ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) 
Rules which states that the Tribunal is to apply rules of international law as 
long as the parties have not agreed differently. They also make a reference 
to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which states 
that  an  element  of  international  law  is  ”the  general  principles  of  law 
recognized by civilized nations”.  This means that the reasoning applied by 51
the Tribunal in this case is not bound to apply only on cases which concerns 
the same FET formulation, since the same line of argument could have been 
used  to  apply  rules  of  international  law  in  most  other  investor-state 
arbitrations.   
By examining the legal framework in different countries the Tribunal 
conclude that the doctrine of legitimate expectations is a rule of 
international law. Countries mentioned to include the legitimate 
expectations doctrine in the award are Germany, France, England, Argentina 
and Venezuela.  Author Monebhurrun points out that this list might as well 52
include the countries South Africa, Colombia, India, Kenya, Australia, 
Canada, Scotland and Japan as well.   53
 Gold Reserve v. Venezuela, para. 575. 51
 Gold Reserve v. Venezuela, para. 574. The Tribunal also mentions that the principle can be found within 52
European Union Law. 
 Monebhurrun, Nitish. Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela - Enshrining Legitimate 53
Expectations as a General Principle of International Law? Journal of International Arbitration 32, no. 5, p. 
551-562. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2015. p. 556. 
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In Gold Reserve v. Venezuela the doctrine was used in an instrumental way, 
as the doctrine of legitimate expectations was used to establish a breach of 
another component of the FET standard, namely the requirement for the host 
state actions to be transparent, consistent and in good faith.  54
This case points towards an even more general acceptance of the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations, which makes its content even more important to 
define. By defining the doctrine of legitimate expectations as a rule of 
international law, one might use this classification to learn more about the 
principle. If one is to argue that the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
originated from general principles of law found in different societies around 
the world, this also means that through the use of a comparative analysis of 
the different legal frameworks one might be able to get a better 
understanding of the doctrine of legitimate expectations.   55
3.4 Inconsistency and lack of transparency  
The obligation of the host state to act transparently is closely linked to the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations and one has found that in many arbitral 
awards the host states have failed both to act transparently and to protect the 
investors legitimate expectations. This is to prevent the host state from 
hiding behind unclear and confusing legislation when determining whether 
there has been a breach of the investors legitimate expectations.  The 56
obligation to provide transparency includes that the host state’s legal 
framework is made available to the investor and that any authoritative 
decision affecting the investor can be traced back to the legal framework.  57
The concept of consistency and transparency means that the host state needs 
to supply a stable legal framework. But providing a stable framework is not 
 Gold Reserve v. Venezuela, para. 591. 54
 Monebhurrun, 2015, pp. 559-561. 55
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 237-238.56
 Dolzer, 2008, pp. 133-134. 57
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without its controversy, since interpreting this in the most investor friendly 
way possible could mean that the host state should in principle not change 
their legislation. In this regard there is a famous description of the host 
state’s obligations provided by the Tribunal in Tecmed:  
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light 
of the good faith principle established by international law, requires the 
Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment that 
does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the 
host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know 
beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, 
as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or 
directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. 
[Emphasis added.] 58
This passage is included by Dolzer (2008) as providing ”the most 
comprehensive definition”  of the FET standard, and this passage is sure to 59
have had some impact on the interpretation and development of the FET 
standard. The list demands much of the host state, and it has been called 
”impossible to achieve”  as well as ”a description of perfect public 60
regulation in a perfect world”  and in fact not a standard at all.    61
    
In five of the cases examined in this paper the Tribunal discussed the 
obligation to provide a transparent and consistent legal framework. In 
Clayton v. Canada the Tribunal used the doctrine of the investors legitimate 
expectations to conclude that the host state had not been transparent enough 
in their dealings with the investor. The investors had been encouraged by 
governmental representatives to invest in a certain region, and the investors 
 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. versus The United Mexican States, ICISID Case No. Arb (AF)/58
00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, para. 154. 
 Dolzer, 2008, p. 130. 59
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 60
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 65.
 Douglas, Zachary. Nothing if not critical for investment treaty arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and 61
Methanex. Arbitration International, Vol. 22, No. 1 pp 27-52. LCIA, 1 March 2006. p. 28. 
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got the reasonable expectations that they were allowed to invest in the area 
as long as they fulfilled the requirements imposed by local and federative 
environmental law. But once they had begun making their investment, a 
special screening process begun (which in itself was unusual but not in 
breach of the FET standard) which was to evaluate the project and 
recommend whether to continue or discontinue the project. In their 
evaluation, they were to follow certain guidelines in accordance with 
national law. These guidelines were seemingly not followed, and instead of 
evaluating the project based on environmental concerns the committee in 
charge of the process chose not the recommend the project due to 
”community core values”, a term not apparent in national law. By evaluating 
on values not mentioned in the guidelines, the investor did not know on 
what basis their project was being evaluated and thus could not prepare a 
proper defense or argument for their investment. This conduct was 
according to the Tribunal a breach of the FET standard due to lack of 
transparency.  
In Micula and others v. Romania the Tribunal discussed the application of 
the obligation for the host state to act consistent and transparent. They cited 
the Saluka Investment award which emphasized a balanced approach, and 
concluded that the question is not if the host state has acted inconsistent or 
with a lack of transparency. Rather the question is if the host state acted 
inconsistent, or with a lack transparency, if they in doing so acted unfairly or 
inequitably in their relation towards the investors.  This interpretation of 62
the requirements to act transparent and consistent is problematic, as they in 
turn refer to the concept of fair and equitable treatment, terms we are trying 
to define by referring to transparency and consistency. Nevertheless, the 
addition by the Tribunal should avoid placing unrealistic restrictions on the 
host state’s actions.  
 Micula and others v. Romania, para. 533. 62
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3.5 Arbitrary or discriminatory actions  
The prohibition against arbitrary and discriminatory actions are implied in 
the plain meaning of the words “fair and equitable”. Arbitrary actions stand 
out due to the motivation behind them, more specifically if an action 
damages an investors interest without having a legitimate purpose the 
actions could be considered arbitrary. Especially so if one is able to 
determine that the host state is biased or have acted with prejudice.  63
Actions which influence the investor in a negative way are not in 
themselves arbitrary, even if the decision at hand might not have been the 
best of the options available. This has been made clear by the Tribunal in 
Enron v. Argentina  where it was stated that it is not for the Tribunal to 64
decide whether the host state actions were ”good or bad”, and instead they 
focused on the fact that the government had the best of intentions in mind 
and they thought what they did was the best course of action available to 
them in light of the crisis at hand.  A similar approach is found in Micula 65
and others v. Romania, where the host state actions were not found to be 
arbitrary due to the fact that the government’s actions were motivated by a 
rational policy and their actions were not unreasonable in trying to uphold 
this policy.   66
The prohibition against discriminatory actions are sometimes regarded as a 
component of its own, separate from the prohibition against arbitrary 
actions.  Among the cases examined in this essay, all of the cases regarding 67
the prohibition against arbitrary actions have included the prohibition 
against discriminatory action and vice versa. Discriminatory actions and 
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 63
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012, p. 78. 
 Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P versus Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 64
22 May 2007. 
 Enron v. Argentina, para. 281.65
 Micula and others v. Romania, paras. 756 and forward, particularly 802. 66
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 67
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 81. 
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arbitrary actions thus seem linked and are closely related to each other, but 
the same could be said of the components legitimated expectations and 
transparency which I have presented as two different components. The two 
prohibitions are not cumulative, if one finds that the actions are either 
discriminatory or arbitrary this is sufficient for a breach of the FET standard.   
The prohibition against discriminatory actions affects both actions which 
have discriminatory intent as well as those actions which have a 
discriminatory effect. The ELSI  ruling in the International Court of Justice 68
offers some guidance and is often referred to by tribunals.  Salacuse 69
concluded through a reading of the judgement that there are four elements to 
the concept of discrimination: “(i) an intentional intent, (ii) in favour of a 
national, (iii) against a foreign investor and (iv) that is not taken under 
similar circumstances against another national” .  70
Yet the main focus of the prohibition against discriminatory actions within 
the application of the FET standard is not that of nationality since this is 
covered by the common ”most favored nation” and ”national treatment” 
clauses. Rather the prohibition of discriminatory actions within the FET 
standard is focused on other grounds, such as discrimination based on sex, 
gender or religion.  71
3.6 Denial of justice 
That denial of justice is part of the FET standard is made clear by past 
awards as well as the treaties themselves.  For example, in the US model 72
BIT of 2012 the FET standard includes “the obligation not to deny justice in 
 Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (United States v. Italy), International Court of Justice, Reports 68
1989, p. 15, 20 Juli 1989. 
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 240-241.69
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 241. 70
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 71
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 82. 
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 242.72
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criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance 
with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of 
the world” .  73
Salacuse finds that in investor-state arbitration the tribunals have found a 
breach of the FET standard due to denial of justice most often due to the 
following three types of neglect: (i) failing to give proper notification of a 
hearing or process which affects the investors interest, (ii) failing to invite or 
not allowing the investor to appear at the hearing or process or (iii) when the 
decision was influenced by bias or prejudice.  This list can be 74
complemented by the following of what is likely to constitute a denial of 
justice according to the UNCTAD study: 
(a)  Denial of access to justice and the refusal of courts to decide;  
(b)  Unreasonable delay in proceedings;  
(c)  Lack of a court’s independence from the legislative and the executive 
branches of the State;  
(d)  Failure to execute final judgments or arbitral awards;  
(e)  Corruption of a judge;  
(f)  Discrimination against the foreign litigant;  
(g)  Breach of fundamental due process guarantees, such as a failure to give 
notice of the proceedings and failure to provide an opportunity to be heard.   75
To provide a definition of what is to be considered a denial of justice is not a 
simple task and the authors of the study themselves say that trying to 
provide a comprehensive list is ”bound to fail” .  76
As one can see from the above, central to the concept of denial of justice is 
the conduct of governmental organs and particularly those dealing with 
administrative justice. But there is a certain vagueness to its application and 
 US model BIT of 2012, Article 5, 2 (a). 73
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 242-243.74
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 75
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. pp. 80-81.
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 76
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 80. 
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the concept has been interpreted in different ways. Interpreted in its broadest 
sense, some scholars mean that the concept covers all kinds of wrongful acts 
done by a host state against foreigners.  77
Among the cases examined in this paper, the concept has been interpreted 
narrowly compared to the interpretation mentioned above. In Vanessa v. 
Venezuela, Hassan v. Romania , Mamidoil v. Albania and Hesham v. 78
Indonesia the claimants were all unsatisfied with dealings of the national 
courts and claimed that there had been a denial of justice. In Vanessa v. 
Venezuela the applications to the courts regarding interim relief were dealt 
with poorly (among other things the courts responses were slow), while in 
Hassan v. Romania and Mamidoil v. Albania the claimants were dissatisfied 
with national court rulings. In none of these cases did the Tribunal find that 
there had been a denial of justice, emphasizing that the threshold for there to 
be a breach of the FET in this regard is high. In the awards where claimants 
were dissatisfied with national court rulings, the Tribunal has emphasized 
that investor-state arbitration is not a supra-court and it is not their role to 
act as an appeal instance regarding decisions from national courts.   79
Hesham v. Indonesia  is the only case of the cases in the scope of this study 80
in which the Tribunal found there to be a denial of justice. The Tribunal 
turned to the principles evolved within international human rights doctrine 
to define when there had been a denial of justice. The Tribunal discussed, 
inter alia, the provisions found in International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), and case law from the European Court of Human 
Rights.  In the award Indonesia had tried the claimant in his absence, 81
 Salacuse, 2010, pp. 241-242. 77
 Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc. and Alfa El Corporation versus Romania, ICSID Case 78
No. ARB/10/13, Award, 2 March 2015.
 Hassan v. Romania, para. 764 and Mamidoil v. Albania para. 436.79
 Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq versus The Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL Rules, Award, 15 December 80
2014.
 Hesham v. Indonesia, paras. 556-569 and para 575 and forward. 81
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without proper notification of his trial and found him guilty. Since none of 
the exceptions in ICCPR which allowed trials in absentia were applicable, 
the Tribunal found that Indonesia’s actions constituted a breach of the 
ICCPR and thus also a breach of the FET standard in the applicable BIT.  
Of note is also the tendency among the cases examined to emphasize the 
high threshold needed for the states conduct to breach the FET standard in 
regards to denial of justice claims. This indicates that the threshold is higher 
when concerning denial of justice claims than if it concerns other 
components of the FET standard. That the threshold level is different 
depending on which component the claim is based on is also indicated by 
the often cited paragraph from Waste Management II  which states that host 82
state’s actions are in breach of the FET standard if:  
the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is 
discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or 
involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial 
propriety—as might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in 
judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candour in an 
administrative process.  83
The use of intensifying adjectives in connection to some terms but not 
others indicates that the threshold for the host state’s actions to be in breach 
of the FET is higher in regards to some types of breaches. The wording used 
by the Tribunal in regards to denial of justice, ”a manifest failure of natural 
justice”, indicates a high liability threshold.  
Among the cases examined in this paper, the awards that show that the 
liability threshold is set high in regards to a denial of justice claim are 
Hesham v. Indonesia, Vannessa v. Venezuela , and Mamidoil v. Albania. In 84
 Waste Management, Inc. versus United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30 April 82
2004.
 Waste Management II, para. 98. 83
 Vannessa Ventures Ltd. versus The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/6, 84
Award, 16 January 2013.
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Hesham v. Indonesia the Tribunal emphasized that ”the threshold to 
establish a claim of denial of justice is high” , and a similar statement can 85
be found in Vannessa v. Venezuela . When examining whether a court 86
decision is in breach of the FET standard in Mamidoil v. Albania the 
Tribunal uses intensifying adjectives in describing the necessary conduct 
required for there to be a breach. The relevant paragraph reads as follows: 
”the Supreme Court’s decision […] is not clearly improper, discreditable or 
in shocking disregard of Albanian law [emphasis added]” .   87
3.7 Harassment  
The prohibition against harassment entails, inter alia, prohibition against 
coercion, threats, intimidation and abuse of power. The arrest of executives 
may amount to harassment, but only if it is done on unlawful grounds. 
When finding a breach of the standard on this ground the Tribunal has 
focused on whether the harassment has been repeated and if the actions 
where motivated by trying to unlawfully seize the investors assets.    88
This component can be hard to separate from denial of justice claims and 
claims based on a breach of the investors legitimate expectations. In a past 
award the Tribunal found that the harassment in that particular case 
amounted to a denial of justice, which constituted a breach of the FET 
standard.  One of the cases examined this paper, Rompetrol Group v. 89
Romania , finds that the state harassment through the use of, inter alia, 90
 Hesham v. Indonesia, para. 620. 85
 Vannessa v. Venezuela, para 227: ”Tribunals in other cases have pointed to the high threshold in this 86
regard. [..] The Tribunal considers that to be the correct approach.” 
 Mamidoil v. Albania, para. 769. 87
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 88
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 83. 
 Dolzer, 2008, p. 147. 89
 The Rompetrol Group N.V. versus Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, 6 May 2013.90
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strong fiscal controls is in breach of the investors legitimate expectations 
and constitute a breach of the FET standard.   91
The Rompetrol Group v. Romania case illustrates well the application of this 
component but also highlights the problems with applying it. In this case the 
investor was subjected to an ongoing criminal investigation regarding tax 
fraud by the Romanian authorities. The Tribunal found that investigation in 
itself is legal and the motivation is sound. But the investigation included 
several procedural irregularities which the Tribunal found amounted to a 
breach of the FET to a limited extent, but which did not award the Claimant 
any damages. The question this case highlights is how to deal with a 
situation in which there is a legally motivated investigation towards an 
investor but these actions against the investor might be very harmful to the 
investment. Regarding this scenario, the Tribunal has the following to say: 
In the Tribunal’s considered view, it is part of the legitimate expectations of a 
protected investor – without in any way trenching upon the sovereign right of 
the host State to prescribe and enforce its criminal law – that, if its interests 
find themselves caught up in the criminal process either directly or indirectly, 
means will be sought by the authorities of the host State to avoid any 
unnecessarily adverse effect on those interests or at least to minimise or 
mitigate the adverse effects.  92
  
It is due to lack of effort from the Romanian authorities to minimize or 
mitigate the negative impact on the investment that the Tribunal finds that 
there has been to a limited extend a breach of the FET. But, as the Tribunal 
did not award any damages to the investor and the legal fees of the 
proceedings were shared between the claimant and the respondent, if this 
case has a winner it is the host state. 
 Rompetrol Group v. Romania, para. 278. 91
 Rompetrol Group v. Romania, para. 278.92
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3.8 The host state acts in bad faith  
If a host state acts in bad faith in relation towards the investor, these actions 
would constitute a breach against the FET standard. But according to 
Salacuse, no modern arbitral decisions have included a breach of the FET 
standard due to actions in bad faith. Salacuse offers three reasons for this: (i) 
it is not necessary for there to be a breach, (ii) it can be extremely difficult 
to establish that the host state actions where done in bad faith and (iii) even 
though the state has acted in bad faith, most tribunals would be inclined to 
avoid making such accusations against a state, especially if they can give 
redress to the investor without doing so.  93
Actions in bad faith relate to the host state motivations, and a conspiracy to 
unlawfully overtake the investors assets is an example of the concept. 
Usually this component is incorporated into another component of the FET. 
This has given rise to two questions: (i) is bad faith in itself enough to 
breach the FET standard and (ii) is bad faith required for there to be a 
breach of the FET standard? 
In regards to question (i), the answer is most likely affirmative. Through an 
analysis of past awards it becomes clear that Tribunals are of the view that 
actions in good faith is a basic obligation of the FET standard, and failing to 
uphold this requirement (by actions in bad faith) is a breach of the FET 
standard. The answer to question (ii) is negative. Bad faith is not required 
for there to be breach of the FET standard. This is seen in, among others, 
Micula and others v. Romania, were not only was Romania acting in good 
faith, they were even acting reasonably.   94
 Salacuse, 2010, p. 243.93
 Dolzer, 2008, pp. 144-147. 94
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4 The convergence of different FET 
formulations  
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will present my examination of the attitudes the Tribunals 
have towards the different FET formulations. As mentioned above, in this 
paper I discuss three different types of FET: 
1. Unqualified FET 
2. FET in accordance with principles of international law 
3. FET linked to the minimum standard of treatment 
In the next section I will examine what can be said of the Tribunals attitude 
in regards to the differences in application or the convergence of the 
different unqualified FET and the FET linked to the minimum standard. The 
section after that will discuss the differences and the convergence of the 
unqualified FET and FET in accordance with principles of international law. 
It will also become apparent that the FET linked to the minimum standard of 
treatment and FET in accordance with principles of international law can be 
very similar in their applications but at the same time the cases examined in 
this papers presents us with conflicting attitudes in regards to the 
interpretation process of the FET standard.   
4.2 Are the unqualified FET and the FET linked to 
the minimum standard of treatment converging?    
Some authors argue that the unqualified FET should be interpreted as an 
independent treaty terms which are separate from the international minimum 
standard.  There have been instances where Tribunals acknowledged and 95
supported this way of interpreting the FET standard by referring to the terms 
 Dumberry, Patrick. The Protection of Investors Legitimate Expectations and the Fair and Equitable 95
Treatment Standard under NAFTA Article 1105. Journal of International Arbitration 31, no. 1 pp. 47–74. 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2014, p. 50. 
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as an ”autonomous FET”, for example in Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania  and 96
Saluka Investment v. Czech Republic . The very idea of the ”autonomous 97
FET” is that it is standalone and a term which has originated and developed 
through treaties and treaty practice. This means that it is separate from MST, 
which originated from international customary law, in contrast to the 
autonomous FET which originated from treaties.  
Thus, I looked at how many cases of the ones examined in which the 
discussion of whether FET was autonomous or not was brought up. 
Including the awards concerning a FET linked to the MST, I found five 
cases in which the term autonomous was brought up in conjunction with 
FET. But in not one did the Tribunal provide a clear view of their opinion as 
the Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania Tribunal did. The Tribunal in Micula and 
others v. Romania highlighted the fact that the Claimant is of the view that 
the standard is autonomous and this view was not contested by the 
Respondent, thus implying that they are dealing with an autonomous FET.  
One the most interesting comments from a Tribunal in regards to the debate, 
is the one made by the Tribunal in Rompetrol Group v. Romania. In this 
case, the Claimant interpreted the FET as an autonomous one, and when it 
was up to the Tribunal to provide a definition of the FET standard, they 
came with the following statement:  
It sees no benefit in engaging in an abstract debate as to whether Article 3(1), 
and in particular its reference to ‘fair and equitable treatment,’ was or was not 
intended by the Parties simply to incorporate the ‘minimum standard’ under 
customary international law, still less to engage in any debate as to what that 
‘minimum standard’ should now be understood to be. It prefers instead (in 
keeping with the approach adopted by other arbitral tribunals) to follow the 
ordinary meaning of the words used, in their context, and in the light of the 
object and purpose of the BIT.  98
 Biwater Gauff Ltd versus United Republic of Tanzania, ICISD Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008. 96
para. 591.
 Saluka Investment v. Czech Republic, para. 294.97
 Rompetrol Group v. Romania, para. 197.98
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As such, it presents us with a solution to the problem by simply ignoring it. 
In Clayton v. Canada, which concerns a FET linked to the MST, the 
Claimant tries to argue that the FET standard is autonomous and adds 
substantial content to the MST, despite the interpretation notes published by 
the contracting states. This argument the Tribunal, agreeing with the 
Respondent, does not accept.  99
My intention with this overview of the Tribunals attitude towards the 
concept of an ”autonomous FET” was to find arguments against the 
convergence of the two terms FET and MST. Unfortunately the results 
yielded were unsatisfactory. The only conclusion to draw from this is that 
among the cases the concept of an ”autonomous FET” is not very popular, 
not even among the claims, and it cannot present any evidence against the 
two terms converging. This in itself is of course not any evidence of the two 
concept converging. 
But I did manage to find some signs that the different FET formulations 
were converging by looking at which past awards were cited among the 
awards examined. 
There is no such thing as binding precedents within investor-state 
arbitration. As such, there is no obligation for a Tribunal to pay attention to 
any past awards on the same subject. But, even without obligation they are 
allowed to and it was common practice among the cases I examined for the 
Tribunal to make references to past awards to give credibility to their 
arguments. Without binding precedent there is no guaranteed way to know if 
an award is going to be influential on future awards, it depends on how well 
argued the Tribunal analysis is. A well argued award might influence future 
 Clayton v. Canada para. 432. 99
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awards in many years to come, but at the same time a not so well argued 
award might have no influence at all on future awards.  
In eight of fourteen cases I examined, the Tribunal in their arguments made 
references to the Waste Management II case. Of these eight, five was in 
regards to FET and two in regards to MST. Waste Management II is a 
NAFTA case decided after the interpretation notes which makes it clear that 
Article 1105 in NAFTA equals the MST, and still other Tribunals cite this 
case when they are defining the FET. This, I believe, is a clear sign that the 
two terms are indeed converging.  
I will also point out that there are other cases which make similar points, but 
the Waste Management II case was the most popular case to cite that I 
managed to find within the cases I chose to examine. In Gold Reserve v. 
Venezuela, an award dealing with a FET in accordance with principles of 
international law, the Tribunal cites the Neer case. The Neer case provided a 
definition of the MST and it is still being referred to even though the case is 
over 80 years old. Of course, the Neer case has a very limited influence 
today on the two standards, as most tribunals will argue either that the Neer 
case no longer offers the correct definition of the content of MST or that 
what was seen as egregious in 1926 is not the same as what would be seen 
as egregious today.  Nevertheless, that some Tribunals make references to 100
that case when discussing the FET standard today makes it clear to me that 
there is link between the two terms.  
The Mondev  case is another NAFTA case which concerns the MST which 101
were cited by Gold Reserve v. Venezuela and Micula and others v. Romania, 
two cases which concern the FET standard. The examination I have done of 
this pattern, of FET cases citing MST cases, is far from conclusive. 
Nonetheless, I believe one can use this as sign that the terms are converging. 
 See above, footnote 27. 100
 Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 11 101
October 2002.
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From my cases alone one would have to assume that they are converging in 
the direction towards the MST, due to the fact that I cannot provide 
examples of the contrary, that is MST cases which cite FET cases. But with 
my selection only consisting of two cases concerning a FET linked to the 
MST, one would definitely need to examine this subject further if one would 
like to be able to make more definite conclusions.  
Of course, my use of references alone is hardly convincing by itself since 
the Tribunal could be referencing the case due to explaining how it is not 
applicable. For an overview of how the Waste Management II and the 
Saluka investments were cited in the awards, see Supplement A.  
4.3 Are the unqualified FET and FET in accordance 
with principles of international law converging?  
Only two of the cases examined concerns a FET in accordance with 
principles of international law, Vannessa v. Venezuela and Gold Reserve v. 
Venezuela. What I found interesting, is how the Tribunal in Gold Reserve v. 
Venezuela puts a lot of weight on the wording of the FET, while the Tribunal 
in Vannessa v. Venezuela seems to completely disregard the link to 
international law. Both cases are based on the same BIT and the FET is 
formulated as such:  
Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the principles of 
international law, accord investments or returns of investors of the other 
Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security.  102
In Gold Reserve v. Venezuela the Tribunal does not begin their definition of 
the FET standard through the use of VCLT and the ordinary meaning of the 
words, instead they have the following to say about the FET and its wording 
in the BIT:  
 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela for the 102
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Article 2 (2). 
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Article II(2) of the BIT refers to the “principles of international law” in 
accordance with which fair and equitable treatment is to be bestowed. To 
determine these principles the Tribunal must consider the present status of 
development of public international law in the field of investment protection. 
It is the Tribunal’s view that public international law principles have evolved 
since the Neer case and that the standard today is broader than that defined in 
the Neer case on which Respondent relies.   103
As such they begin their analysis more in line with how one might interpret 
the MST standard, that is by beginning at its roots, namely the Neer case. 
The Tribunal focuses on past awards when providing its definition of the 
FET standard, citing among others Waste Management II which is a case 
regarding the MST within the NAFTA context.  
Maybe more importantly, they also cite the Saluka Investment case which 
concerns an unqualified FET. A trend among the cases examined seems to 
be that if the case concerns MST one prefers citing other cases regarding 
MST, while if the case regards FET one can cite both cases regarding MST 
and FET. This case is no exception, since it is not explicitly linked to the 
MST.  
Nevertheless it seems to me as if the wording of the FET has influenced the 
Tribunal which therefore interprets the FET more in line with how one 
would interpret the MST, yet still not in the same way as if it had been the 
actual MST. Ergo, in this case it seems as though the Tribunal has gone 
down a middle road. According to the UNCTAD study, by providing the IIA 
or BIT with this kind of formulation of the FET one prevents the use of a 
semantic approach and instead imposes on the Tribunal to use principles of 
international law instead. The principles of international law includes, but 
are not limited to, international customary law.  This means that the 104
interpretation in this case should be the same as if the FET had been linked 
 Gold Reserve v. Venezuela, para. 567. 103
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 104
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 22.
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to the MST, but it is not. One big difference from the other two cases 
concerning the FET linked to the MST is that this case refers to at least one 
case which concerns an unqualified FET, namely the Saluka Investment 
case.  
As such, this case could be a sign that the two terms are indeed converging 
and are in fact very similar to each other. But on the other hand, it is very 
hard to determine whether this case has applied a higher threshold needed 
for a breach of the treaty, which, if any, is probably the main difference 
between the unqualified FET and the MST.  
In the other case which regards the same BIT, Vannessa v. Venezuela, the 
Tribunal has the following to say about the FET standard: 
The Tribunal recognizes that there are different formulations of the precise 
content of the FET standard, but observes that they all have in common the 
requirement that the standard does not guarantee the success or profitability 
of an investment but requires that the treatment of investments not fall below 
a minimum standard of fairness and equitableness that all investors have a 
right to expect.   105
The Tribunal does not comment on the FETs link to the principles of 
international law anywhere in the award, so it is hard to tell if the wording 
of the FET has influenced the award or not. They cite only three cases, and 
this is in relevance to the high threshold when it comes to claims relating to 
denial of justice. Two of these cases are NAFTA cases relating to the MST, 
and the third is a case regarding an unqualified FET in a BIT.  The 106
mention of a ”high threshold”  may indicate that the interpretation of the 107
FET is leaning towards the MST, but it is more likely due to the fact that 
 Vannessa v. Venezuela, para. 222.105
 They cite the following cases: Waste Management v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/106
00/3, Award, April 30, 2004, para. 98, Cf., Loewen Group v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, June 26, 2003, para. 132 and Alex Genin v. The Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/2, Award, June 25, 2001, para. 371.
 Vannessa v. Venezuela, para. 227. 107
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Tribunals when regarding claims relating to a breach of denial of justice 
have applied a higher threshold than when regarding a breach of any of the 
other elements included in the FET.  108
4.4 Is there a difference in the threshold depending on 
the FET formulation?  
In this section, I will examine how the Tribunals express their view of the 
liability threshold in the awards, and compare the findings between the 
unqualified FETs, the FETs linked to the MST and the FETs linked to the 
principles of international law. 
Beginning with the unqualified FETs, these are in the clear majority of the 
awards examined, with ten of fourteen awards concerning this type of FET. 
In only five of these awards did I manage to find any utterance from the 
Tribunal regarding the level of treatment they were applying. Unfortunately 
the matter gets further complicated by the fact that depending on what kind 
of breach the awards focused on this effects the liability threshold. Three of 
the cases came with what seemed to be general guidelines describing the 
liability threshold, which I interpret as being relevant mainly regarding 
breaches due to arbitrary or discriminatory actions.  
In Micula and others v. Romania the Tribunal simply stated that the host 
state’s treatment of the investor need not be as bad as ”egregious”, meaning 
that the threshold is not as high as in the Neer case and citing among others 
the Waste Management II award.  Minnotte and Lewis v. Poland states that 109
for there to be a breach the host state must act ”delinquently” or in an 
”improper manner”, citing, among others, Waste Management II, Saluka 
Investment and Tecmed.  In Tulip v. Turkey  they said that the host state 110 111
 See section 4.3. 108
 Micula and others v. Romania, para. 524.109
 Minnotte and Lewis v. Poland, para. 198-99.110
 Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. versus Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case 111
No. ARB/11/28, Award, 10 March 2014.
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actions must not constitute ”treatment in such an unjust or arbitrary manner 
that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable”, citing Saluka 
Investment.  The last two awards state that when the actions constituting a 112
breach of the FET due to denial of justice the threshold is set high.  113
Turning to the cases regarding FET in accordance with international law, 
this category of cases only holds two awards: Vannessa v. Venezuela and 
Gold Reserve v. Venezuela. Vannessa v. Venezuela does not comment on the 
general liability threshold for the applicable FET standard, but states that 
when it regards claims relating to denial of justices the threshold is high.  114
In Gold Reserve v. Venezuela on the other hand, they cite the Saluka 
Investment award which says that host actions will not breach the standard 
as long as they are ”justifiable by public policies” and ”does not manifestly 
violate the requirements of consistency, transparency, even- handedness and 
non-discrimination”.115
  
In both of the two Tribunals applying a FET linked to the MST one could 
find that the Tribunals had discussed the level of treatment required for a 
breach of the standard. The Tribunal in Teco v. Guatemala  says that the 116
standard is ”infringed by conduct attributed to the State and harmful to the 
investor if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair or idiosyncratic, is 
discriminatory or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome 
which offends judicial propriety”  and that ”a complete lack of candor or 117
good faith on the part of the regulator in its dealings with the investor, as 
 Tulip v. Turkey, para. 401.112
 Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq versus The Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL Rules, Award, 15 December 113
2015, para. 620 and Mamidoil v. Albania, para. 769.
 Vannessa v. Venezuela, para. 227. 114
 Gold Reserve v. Venezuela, para. 569, citing Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic, paras. 307-308. 115
 Teco Guatemala Holdings LLC versus The Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/17, Award, 116
19 December 2013.
 Teco v. Guatemala, para. 454.117
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well as a total lack of reasoning, would constitute a breach”  of the 118
standard.  
Clayton v. Canada probably provides the most comprehensive material on 
the liability threshold, stating that ”there is a high threshold for the conduct 
of a host state to rise to the level of a NAFTA Article 1105 breach, but that 
there is no requirement in all cases that the challenged conduct reaches the 
level of shocking or outrageous behaviour.”  The Tribunal further states 119
that tribunals need to ”be sensitive to the facts of each case, the potential 
relevance of reasonably relied-on representations by a host state, and a 
recognition that injustice in either procedures or outcomes can constitute a 
breach.”  The Tribunal in Clayton v. Canada relies on the Waste 120
Management II award and cites a long passage from the award when 
discussing which level of treatment the standard requires.   121
Unfortunately this overview provides us with very little material regarding 
the level of treatment necessary to constitute a breach of the FET standard. 
The most important aspect of this is rather how the level of treatment seems 
to differ depending on which aspect of the FET standard that is in focus. 
Quite few of the components of the FET standard seem to qualify to the 
same, vague standard of ”improper”  and ”delinquent”  but need not be 122 123
”egregious”  or ”outrageous” . Arbitrary, discriminatory and inconsistent 124 125
actions seem to fall under this level of treatment within the regime of the 
unqualified FETs, but if the threshold is higher in regards to the two other 
types of FETs is hard to say. The Tribunal in Clayton v. Canada states that 
 Teco v. Guatemala, para. 456.118
 Clayton v. Canada, para. 442.119
 Clayton v. Canada, para. 442.120
 Clayton v. Canada, para. 442. 121
 Minnotte and Lewis v. Poland, para. 198-99.122
 Minnotte and Lewis v. Poland, para. 198-99.123
 Micula and others v. Romania, para. 524.  124
 Micula and others v. Romania, para. 524. 125
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the threshold for breach of the FET (linked to MST) is ”high” , which 126
makes it stand out from the other cases. Similar opinions were not found in 
the awards which regarded the FET in accordance with principles of 
international law (which should be at the same threshold level)  or the 127
other case concerning a FET linked to MST. 
To determine a common ground among the awards, this becomes more 
apparent when looking at the cases cited by the Tribunals in their reasoning 
of the content of the standard. Waste Management II is a case which has 
been cited among both awards dealing with the FET as well as the FET 
linked to MST, and as such seems to provide with one of the more generally 
accepted definitions of the FET standard and its applicable level. Another 
interesting case is the Saluka investment case which is popular to cite in 
regards to the unqualified FETs, and was also cited by Gold Reserve v. 
Venezuela which regards a FET in accordance with the principles of 
international law. These are the two most popular cases to cite among the 
awards examined, Waste Management II being cited eight times and Saluka 
Investment being cited six times.  Examples of other popular cases to cite 128
are S.D Myers  which was cited four times and Thunderbird  which was 129 130
cited three times.  131
Turning our attention to the Waste Management II award, there is one key 
paragraph which is the focus of the Tribunals in the cases examined, being 
 Clayton v. Canada, para. 444. 126
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series 127
on Issues in International Investment Agreements II. 2012. p. 22.
 See supplement A.128
 S.D. Myers Inc. versus Canada, UNCITRAL Rules, First Partial Award, 13 November 2000.129
 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation versus Mexico, UNCITRAL Rules, Award, 26 January 130
2006.
 Awards citing Myers: Micula and others v. Romania, Teco v. Guatemala, British Caribbean Bank v. Belize 131
and Clayton v. Canada. Awards citing Thunderbird: Micula and others v. Romania, Gold Reserve v. 
Venezuela and Clayton v. Canada. 
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cited no less than six times. The Tribunal in Waste Management II came to 
the following conclusion regarding the FET:  
The search here is for the Article 1105 standard of review, and it is not 
necessary to consider the specific results reached in the cases discussed 
above. But as this survey shows, despite certain differences of emphasis a 
general standard for Article 1105 is emerging. Taken together, the S.D. 
Myers, Mondev, ADF and Loewen cases suggest that the minimum standard 
of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct 
attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, 
grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the 
claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process 
leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety—as might be the case 
with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete 
lack of transparency and candour in an administrative process. In applying 
this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in breach of representations 
made by the host State which were reasonably relied on by the claimant.   132
Noticeably, their conclusion is one drawn from past awards. Being itself a 
very popular case to cite, there is no denying the heavy impact of past 
awards when defining the FET standard even though the international 
investment law regime lacks binding precedent. Nevertheless, this case’s 
popularity among Tribunals independent of the formulation of the FET in 
the treaty makes this passage stand out as particularly important when 
defining the content of the FET.  
Saluka Investment has no key paragraph as such, as the different cases have 
cited somewhat different paragraphs. Nevertheless the focus in undoubtedly 
on the paragraphs 296-309, which concern the Tribunal’s interpretation of 
the standard. Their approach is similar to that of the Tribunal in Waste 
Management II in that they rely on past awards, but since this award 
concerns an unqualified FET there are some key differences. First, this is 
what they have to say about the content of the FET standard:  
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but 
rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign 
 Waste Management II, para. 98.132
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investment and extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations. 
That in turn calls for a balanced approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s 
substantive provisions for the protection of investments, since an 
interpretation which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign 
investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign 
investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying 
the parties’ mutual economic relations. […] 
The “fair and equitable treatment” standard in Article 3.1 of the Treaty is an 
autonomous Treaty standard and must be interpreted, in light of the object 
and purpose of the Treaty, so as to avoid conduct of the Czech Republic that 
clearly provides disincentives to foreign investors. The Czech Republic, 
without undermining its legitimate right to take measures for the protection 
of the public interest, has therefore assumed an obligation to treat a foreign 
investor’s investment in a way that does not frustrate the investor’s 
underlying legitimate and reasonable expectations. A foreign investor whose 
interests are protected under the Treaty is entitled to expect that the Czech 
Republic will not act in a way that is manifestly inconsistent, non-
transparent, unreasonable (i.e. unrelated to some rational policy), or 
discriminatory (i.e. based on unjustifiable distinctions).  133
In this they have applied a balanced approach, in which one must consider 
the investor’s need for protection as well as the host state’s right to legislate. 
I believe their focus on this aspect of the FET is one of the reasons the 
awards have been a popular source of reference, as well as the fact that their 
reasonings in regards to the standard is well developed and thorough. The 
Tribunal has also a few things to say about the relationship between the FET 
and MST: 
[I]t appears that the difference between the Treaty standard laid down in 
Article 3.1 and the customary minimum standard, when applied to the 
specific facts of a case, may well be more apparent than real. To the extent 
that the case law reveals different formulations of the relevant thresholds, an 
in- depth analysis may well demonstrate that they could be explained by the 
contextual and factual differences of the cases to which the standards have 
been applied. […] Whichever the difference between the customary and the 
treaty standards may be, this Tribunal has to limit itself to the interpretation 
of the “fair and equitable treatment” standard as embodied in Article 3.1 of 
the Treaty. That Article omits any express reference to the customary 
minimum standard. The interpretation of Article 3.1 does not therefore share 
the difficulties that may arise under treaties (such as the NAFTA) which 
 Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic, paras. 300-309.133
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expressly tie the “fair and equitable treatment” standard to the customary 
minimum standard. Avoidance of these difficulties may even be regarded as 
the very purpose of the lack of a reference to an international standard in the 
Treaty. This clearly points to the autonomous character of a “fair and 
equitable treatment” standard such as the one laid down in Article 3.1 of the 
Treaty.   134
Firstly, they regard the FET in their case as an ”autonomous” standard, 
something no Tribunal did in any of the cases I examined. This means that 
they at least in theory divide the terms FET and MST. But they also make a 
comment regarding their content, stating that the difference between the 
standard may be ”more apparent than real”. To summarize, the Tribunal 
makes a difference between the terms but at the same time voices their 
opinion that there might not be any real difference between them when 
applying them to a particular case.  
 Saluka Investments v. The Czech Republic, paras. 291-294.134
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5. Concluding remarks - Problems and 
solutions   
5.1 Is the threshold level high enough? 
In this subsection, we will be looking at how to apply the liability threshold 
within the legitimate expectations doctrine. After an analysis of the content 
of the FETs components, this is what I found to be most problematic.   
Some Tribunals when discussing the host state’s treatment of the foreign 
investor and the doctrine of legitimate expectations focus on that the 
doctrine includes an obligation to provide a stable legal framework. The 
Tribunal in Tecmed provided with a very investor friendly definition of the 
required conduct by the host state:  
 
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light 
of the good faith principle established by international law, requires the 
Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment that 
does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the 
foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host 
State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know 
beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, 
as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or 
directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. 
[…] The foreign investor also expects the host State to act consistently, i.e. 
without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits issued by 
the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as 
well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities. [Emphasis 
added.]   135
Despite being dismissed by some sources, this has not prevented Tribunals 
from following this kind of reasoning.  In CMS v. Argentina  the 136 137
 Tecmed, para. 154. 135
 For criticism against the Tecmed award, see Douglas, 2006.  136
 CMS Gas Transmission Company versus The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/01/08, 137
Award, 12 May 2005. 
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Tribunal found that even if the reasons behind the host state actions were 
reasonable, this did not matter as there still had been an objective breach of 
the investor’s legitimate expectations.  The Tribunal in Micula and others 138
v. Romania also agrees to a certain degree with the Tribunal in Tecmed, but 
adds that one cannot take this statement from Tecmed too literal as this 
would impose unreasonable restrictions on the host state.   139
Among the cases examined in this essay, this investor friendly view of the 
legitimate expectations has been upheld by the Tribunal in Micula and 
others v. Romania. In this case foreign investors chose to invest in certain 
regions in Romania due to tax reductions available in these regions. 
Romania had under-developed regions with high unemployment and this 
was part of a strategy for Romania to try and increase the living conditions 
in these regions. To get the tax reduction the investor had to fulfill certain 
conditions, for example they had to keep being active in the region for a 
certain amount of time even after the tax reductions became unavailable, 
and failing to fulfill the condition could lead to the investor losing the tax 
reduction privilege and paying retrospectively for the time they paid lesser 
taxes. The tax reductions were to be available for the investors during a 
certain amount of time, but Romania chose to revoke the tax reductions 
earlier than intended.  
This case concerned an unqualified FET, and had it concerned a FET linked 
to the international minimum standard the outcome would most likely have 
been quite different. In the award the Tribunal focuses on the legitimate 
expectations doctrine, and concluded that Romania had failed to fulfill the 
investor’s legitimate expectation because they revoked the tax reduction 
earlier than intended.  
 CMS v. Argentina, para. 278 and forward.  138
 Micula and other v. Romania, para 533: regarding the cited Tecmed passage the Tribunal states that they 139
”agrees with the general thrust of these statements”.  
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The Tribunal states that it first needs to conclude three things: (i) that the 
host state made an assurance or promise, (ii) that the claimants relied on this 
promise when making their investment and (iii) that the expectations the 
claimant had were reasonable.  They also make clear that the assurance or 140
promise can be either specifically made to the investor or just generally 
issued, an interpretation which is not generally accepted within the FET 
regime.  By looking at the purpose as well as the form of the legislation 141
granting the tax reductions the Tribunal finds that the current legislation, 
which specified that it would last until a certain date, constituted a general 
assurance towards the investors.  142
In deciding whether the expectations were reasonable, the Tribunal 
examines this question from two perspectives; (i) under Romanian law and 
(ii) under the context of Romanian’s ascension to EU.  This means that the 143
Tribunal turn to the reasons behind Romania’s actions, and as we will see 
they did revoke the tax reductions due to a specific reason and their actions 
cannot be said to be either arbitrary or discriminatory. During this time, it 
was Romania’s ambition to ascend to EU. The question thus arose whether 
the tax reductions were compatible with EU-law, and eventually it became 
clear that they were not. Therefore Romania decided, in order to comply 
with EU-law, to revoke the tax reductions earlier than intended.   144
The Tribunal in its analyses of whether Romania acted unreasonably 
concludes that they did not act unreasonably when they revoked the tax 
reductions for the investor. But they also conclude that this does not matter 
when it comes to determining whether there has been a breach of the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations. Thus the Tribunal concludes that 
 Micula and other versus Romania, para. 668. 140
 Micula and other versus Romania, para. 671. 141
 Micula and other versus Romania, para. 677. 142
 Micula and other versus Romania, para. 690. 143
 Micula and other versus Romania, para. 739. 144
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Romania, even though they did not act unreasonable, breached the FET due 
to failure to uphold the investor’s legitimate expectations.  145
In its definition of the FET standard, the Tribunal in Micula and others v. 
Romania cites Waste Management II as well as Saluka Investment. Both of 
these awards focus on the balancing aspect of the FET, which means that 
when concluding whether there has been a breach of the standard one must 
respect the host state’s sovereignty and its right to legislate and balance this 
against the investors interest. Yet I have a hard time seeing how the Tribunal 
implemented this principle in the award, since they acknowledge that 
Romania did not act unreasonably and yet they still breached the standard. 
The Tribunal puts Romania in a position were whatever they do they either 
breach international law or they breach EU-law. The EU Commission has, 
since the award was published, asked that Romania do not pay the award (in 
which the Claimant won no less than 90 million USD ) since the award 146
itself would constitute an unlawful state aid according to EU-law. This 
dispute is now being subject to trial in the Court of Justice.  147
Using this kind of approach when applying the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations sets the liability threshold for the host state very low, if one can 
even talk about a liability threshold in this instance. The state conduct does 
not need to be outrageous or even faulty in the traditional sense, all that is 
needed is that the host state’s actions do not comply with the expectations of 
the foreign investors. 
  
The problem with the doctrine of legitimate expectations is that it has a very 
wide scope and may impose unreasonable restrictions on the host state’s 
actions. Then there is the problem regarding its vague definition and 
content. Interpreted in the most investor friendly way, the doctrine is 
 Micula and other versus Romania, para. 827 and para 725. 145
 Actual sum in award: 376,433,229 RON. 146
 Micula and Others v Commission, Court of Justice, Case T-646/14, Case in progress. 147
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standalone and it does not require specific representations from the host 
state. Interpreted in this sense, I believe that the doctrine may allow 
Tribunals to reach unreasonable conclusions. The main example being 
Micula and others v. Romania, in which the host state has put themselves in 
a position in which no matter what they do, they will either breach a BIT or 
EU law. I believe that when a host state acts with the best of intentions and 
try to limit the damages of a current problem at the best of their ability they, 
as a general rule, ought not to have breached the fair and equitable 
treatment.  
This leads us to the concept of good faith. Would it then be reasonable to 
claim that it should be required for the host state to act in bad faith for it to 
breach the FET? This would of course solve the problem with the FET 
standard  and the doctrine of legitimate expectations being too investor 
friendly, but it would also render the FET standard almost toothless. To 
require that the investor prove the host state’s motivation and concluding 
there has been bad faith would most likely lead to very few investors 
winning in investor-state arbitration, even in cases where the investor has 
been treated unfairly.  
The natural way to limit the scope of the doctrine in favor of the host state is 
thus to limit it to an instrumental use, meaning that it can only be considered 
when there has been a breach of another component. Further, it may be 
required that specific representations are required. This, I believe might help 
with the issues but I am not sure it will suffice.  
In the newly negotiated EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) one has tried to amend a lot of the issues with the FET 
standard. One issue is the lack of clarity, and thus the signatory states have 
tried to define the FET more clearly in the treaty:  
Each Party shall accord in its territory to covered investments of the other 
Party and to investors with respect to their covered investments fair and 
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equitable treatment and full protection and security in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 to 6. 
A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment referenced in 
paragraph 1 where a measure or series of measures constitutes: 
Denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; 
Fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of 
transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings. 
Manifest arbitrariness; 
Targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race 
or religious belief; 
Abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; 
[…] 
When applying the above fair and equitable treatment obligation, a tribunal 
may take into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an 
investor to induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, 
and upon which the investor relied in deciding to make or maintain the 
covered investment, but that the Party subsequently frustrated.  148
In this treaty the components of the FET have been explicitly listed. This is 
a great attempt at clarifying its content, and note also that it does not 
mention any requirement for there to be a stable or consistent legal 
environment, a requirement that has been discussed as part of the FET and 
the legitimate expectations doctrine that potentially may impose very strict 
restrictions on the host state actions. The omission of this is a good sign.  
The article also explicitly mentions the doctrine of the investors legitimate 
expectations. The wording is not entirely clear, but it would seem as though 
it is a limited version of the doctrine. First, it is clear that specific 
representations are needed for there to be any expectations. It seems as if 
there has only been a breach of the legitimate expectations doctrine, this will 
not amount to a treaty breach, otherwise it would have been listed among 
the list of measures earlier in the article.  
 Article X.9: Treatment of Investors and of Covered Investments of CETA.148
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It is for the future to decide if the compromises made in CETA are enough, 
or if the FET standard is still up for an extensive interpretation in favor of 
the investors. I would prefer a treaty which explicitly forbade the use of the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations, since if one does not forbid it Tribunals 
might reason that it is part of international law and thus applicable on the 
present case. This because I fail to see that the benefits of the doctrine 
outweigh the negative.  
If one were to solve FET claims without the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations, one would need to clearly define the limits of each of the other 
components, something I would prefer and I believe that in the long run this 
would be most beneficial to the international investment regime.  
5.2 Convergence of FET formulations  
In this paper, we have come across two cases in which the Tribunals voice 
their opinion that there might not be any practical difference between the 
MST and the FET, namely Saluka Investment and Rompetrol Group v. 
Romania. Both of these cases regard the unqualified FET, and the Tribunal 
have interpreted the FET through the use of VCLT and past awards. In doing 
so no one can claim that the Tribunals have done anything wrong. It would 
have been different if the awards were in regards to the MST, and they 
would have claimed that this has the same content and liability threshold as 
the FET standard. The closest we come in this regard is Gold  Reserve  v. 
Venezuela, which cites Saluka Investments in a case regarding an FET in 
accordance with principles of international law. Nevertheless, these two 
cases are indeed signs that the two terms are converging, or at least that 
there are forces among arbitrators within the international investment 
regime that would want them to be. But one can hardly point to these two 
cases as proof that the terms are converging.  
Then we have the Waste Management II case, which provides a general 
definition of the FET linked to the MST. The fact that this one key 
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paragraph has been cited in eight of the fourteen cases examined surely says 
something of the general acceptance the definition made by the Tribunal in 
Waste Management II has. But more important is the fact that the paragraph 
has been cited by Tribunals dealing with different FET formulations. Of the 
cases examined, Vannessa v. Venezuela, Micula and others v. Romania, Teco 
v. Guatemala, Minnotte and Lewis v. Poland, Gold Reseve v. Venezuela, 
British Caribbean Bank v. Belize, Mamidoil v. Albania and Clayton v. 
Canada were the ones which cited Waste Management II, paragraph 98. 
These include both of the two cases concerning a FET formulation in 
accordance with the principles of international law , both of the two cases 149
concerning a FET linked to the MST  and four of the cases concerning an 150
unqualified FET . I believe that this finding is one of the strongest signs 151
that I have found that point to the terms converging.  
5.3 End summary 
In this paper I have identified the legitimate expectations doctrine, together 
with a requirement to provide a consistent, stable legal framework to be the 
most problematic component of the FET. This component can be limited in 
several ways, and it has been in the newly negotiated CETA. This is a step 
in the right direction, but I would prefer to see it removed it in its entirety 
from the international investment regime. This because I fail to see the 
benefits of the doctrine, and I do not believe that removing the doctrine 
from the FET standard would leave the investors without protections.  
In regards to the other question I set out to answer in this paper regarding 
the different FET formulations and whether these are converging or not, my 
answer is not as clear. The many Tribunals citing the Waste Management II 
award point to a will among the arbitrations to try and commit to a 
jurisprudence constante, but as pointed out by the tribunal in Mamidoil v. 
 Vannessa v. Venezuela and Gold Reseve v. Venezuela149
 Teco v. Guatemala and Clayton v. Canada150
 Micula and others v. Romania, Minnotte and Lewis v. Poland, British Caribbean Bank v. Belize and 151
Mamidoil v. Albania
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Albania the international investment regime lacks coherent past awards.  152
But despite many tribunals citing the Waste Management II award, some did 
not. Even if the Waste Management II may be singled out as an 
exceptionally influential award, it does not include an accepted and 
complete definition of the FET standard. And with new treaties using new 
formulations of the FET, as CETA does, the divergence will continue. But at 
the same time this will make sure that the FET evolves, and due to treaties 
like CETA it might begin to evolve into a provision with a more balanced 
application.  
 Mamidoil v. Albania, para. 603. 152
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Supplement A  
Overview of instances where the Tribunal cited or made reference to Waste 
Management 2 or Saluka Investment in their discussion regarding the definition 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
Vannessa Ventures Ltd. versus The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/6, Award, 16 January 2013
Para 227 Tribunals in other cases have pointed to the high threshold in 
this regard. In Waste Management, the award referred to “a 
lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends 
judicial propriety – as might be the case with a manifest 
failure of natural justice.”227 The Tribunal considers that to 
be the correct approach. The question is not whether the host 
State legal system is performing as efficiently as it ideally 
could: it is whether it is performing so badly as to violate 
treaty obligations to accord fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security. The Tribunal does not consider 
that the delays in this case are of an order that constitute 
conduct that falls below the minimum standard demanded by 
the Treaty.  
227 = Waste Management v. United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, April 30, 2004, ¶ 
98. Cf., Loewen Group v. United States 
of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
98/3, Award, June 26, 2003, ¶ 132; Alex 
Genin v. The Republic of Estonia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, June 
25, 2001, ¶ 371.  
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Oan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L. 
and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. versus Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, 
Award, 11 December 2013
Para 504 This Tribunal agrees with the Saluka tribunal in that “[t]his is 
probably as far as one can get by looking at the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of the terms of Article 3.1 of the Treaty.”81  
81 = Saluka v. Czech Republic, ¶ 297. 
Para 506 Similarly, the tribunal in Waste Management II said that “the 
standard is to some extent a flexible one which must be 
adapted to the circumstances of each case.”83 This has been 
echoed by several tribunals, including in Lauder v. Czech 
Republic84, CMS v. Argentina, Noble Ventures v. 
Romania85, Saluka v. Czech Republic.  
83 = Waste Management v. Mexico II, ¶ 
99 
84 = Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 
September 2001 (hereinafter,  
“Lauder v. Czech Republic”).  
85 = Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11), Award, 
12 October 2005.  
Para 507 The tribunal in Saluka held:  
This does not imply, however, that such standards as laid 
down in Article 3 of the Treaty would invite the Tribunal to 
decide the dispute in a way that resembles a decision ex aequo 
et bono. This Tribunal is bound by Article 6 of the Treaty to 
decide the dispute on the basis of the law, including the 
provisions of the Treaty. Even though Article 3 obviously 
leaves room for judgment and appreciation by the Tribunal, it 
does not set out totally subjective standards which would 
allow the Tribunal to substitute, with regard to the Czech 
Republic’s conduct to be assessed in the present case, its 
judgment on the choice of solutions for the Czech Republic’s. 
As the tribunal in S.D. Myers has said, the “fair and equitable 
treatment” standard does not create an “open-ended mandate 
to second-guess government decision-making”. The standards 
formulated in Article 3 of the Treaty, vague as they may be, 
are susceptible of specification through judicial practice and 
do in fact have sufficient legal content to allow the case to be 
decided on the basis of law. Over the last few years, a number 
of awards have dealt with such standards yielding a fair 
amount of practice that sheds light on their legal meaning.86  
86 = Saluka v. Czech Republic, ¶ 284. 
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Para 512 In view of these considerations, the Tribunal favors a 
balanced view of the goals of the BIT similar to that adopted 
by the Saluka tribunal:  
 
”This is a more subtle and balanced statement of the Treaty’s 
aims than is sometimes appreciated. The protection of foreign 
investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but rather a 
necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging 
foreign investment and extending and intensifying the parties’ 
economic relations. That in turn calls for a balanced approach 
to the interpretation of the Treaty’s substantive provisions for 
the protection of investments, since an interpretation which 
exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign 
investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting 
foreign investments and so undermine the overall aim of 
extending and intensifying the parties’ mutual economic 
relations.  
Seen in this light, the “fair and equitable treatment” standard 
prescribed in the Treaty should therefore be understood to be 
treatment which, if not proactively stimulating the inflow of 
foreign investment capital, does at least not deter foreign 
capital by providing disincentives to foreign investors. An 
investor’s decision to make an investment is based on an 
assessment of the state of the law and the totality of the 
business environment at the time of the investment as well as 
on the investor’s expectation that the conduct of the host State 
subsequent to the investment will be fair and equitable.”88 
88 = Saluka v. Czech Republic, ¶¶ 
304-309.  
Para 522 There is no dispute that conduct that is substantively 
improper, whether because it is arbitrary, manifestly 
unreasonable, discriminatory or in bad faith, will violate the 
fair and equitable treatment standard. As stated by the Waste 
Management II tribunal:  
“[T]he minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable 
treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and 
harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly 
unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes 
the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack 
of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial 
propriety—as might be the case with a manifest failure of 
natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of 
transparency and candour in an administrative process. In 
applying this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in 
breach of representations made by the host State which were 
reasonably relied on by the claimant.”96  
96 = Waste Management v. Mexico II, ¶ 
98. The Tribunal notes that, strictly 
speaking, this case refers to the 
minimum standard of t reatment 
contained in NAFTA Article 1105. 
However, both Parties have relied on 
this definition in their submissions in 
this case, so the Tribunal understands 
that they accept that it is relevant for the 
fair and equitable treatment standard 
under the BIT.  
Para 523 On this subject, the Saluka tribunal stated:  
”A foreign investor protected by the Treaty may in any case 
properly expect that the Czech Republic implements its 
policies bona fide by conduct that is, as far as it affects the 
investors’ investment, reasonably justifiable by public policies 
and that such conduct does not manifestly violate the 
requirements of consistency, transparency, even-handedness 
and nondiscrimination. In particular, any differential treatment 
of a foreign investor must not be based on unreasonable 
distinctions and demands, and must be justified by showing 
that it bears a reasonable relationship to rational policies not 
motivated by a preference for other investments over the 
foreign-owned investment.”97  
97 = Saluka v. Czech Republic, ¶ 307. 
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Para 524 This finding was echoed by the tribunal in Waste 
Management v. Mexico II:  
 
”Both the Mondev and ADF tribunals rejected any suggestion 
that the standard of treatment of a foreign investment set by 
NAFTA is confined to the kind of outrageous treatment 
referred to in the Neer case, i.e. to treatment amounting to an 
“outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an in 
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of 
international standards that every reasonable and impartial 
man would readily recognize its insufficiency.””99  
 
99 = Waste Management v. Mexico II, ¶ 
93. This paragraph has been cited by 
many different tribunals, including 
Chemtura Corporation v. Government of 
Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, 2 August 
2010 (hereinafter, “Chemtura v. 
Canada”), ¶ 215. See Dolzer & Schreuer 
p. 129.  
Para 533 However, as noted by the Saluka tribunal, such propositions 
must be considered in the proper context; “taken too literally, 
they would impose upon host States obligations which would 
be inappropriate and unrealistic.”106  
106 = Saluka v. Czech Republic, ¶ 304. 
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Para 667 Although the question of whether these legitimate 
expectations were breached is a factual one, an overwhelming 
majority of cases supports the contention that, where the 
investor has acquired rights, or where the state has acted in 
such a way so as to generate a legitimate expectation in the 
investor and that investor has relied on that expectation to 
make its investment, action by the state that reverses or 
destroys those legitimate expectations will be in breach of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard and thus give rise to 
compensation.133  
133 = See, e.g., Saluka v. Czech 
Republic, ¶¶ 302 (The standard of “fair 
and equitable treatment” is therefore 
closely tied to the notion of legitimate 
expectations which is the dominant 
element of that standard. By virtue of 
the “fair and equitable treatment” 
standard included in Article 3.1 the 
Czech Republic must therefore be 
regarded as having assumed an 
obligation to treat foreign investors so as 
to avoid the frustration of investors’ 
l e g i t i m a t e a n d r e a s o n a b l e 
expectations”); Tecmed v. Mexico, ¶ 154 
(where the tribunal found that the 
obligation to provide “fair and equitable 
treatment” meant “to provide to 
international investments treatment that 
does not affect the basic expectations 
that were taken into account by the 
f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r t o m a k e t h e 
investment”); CME v. Czech Republic, ¶ 
611 (where the tribunal concluded that 
the Czech authority “breached its 
obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment by evisceration of the 
arrangements in reliance upon with the 
foreign investor was induced to invest”); 
Waste Management v. Mexico II, ¶ 98 
(“In applying [the ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’] standard it is relevant that 
t h e t r e a t m e n t i s i n b r e a c h o f 
representations made by the host State 
which were reasonably relied on by the 
claimant.”); International Thunderbird v. 
Mexico, ¶ 147 (“[t]he concept of 
‘legitimate expectations’ relates, within 
the context of the NAFTA framework, to 
a situation where a Contracting Party’s 
conduct creates reasonable and 
justifiable expectations on the part of an 
investor (or investment) to act in 
reliance on said conduct, such that a 
failure by the NAFTA Party to honour 
those expectations could cause the 
investor (or investment) to suffer 
damages”)  
Para 671 This promise, assurance or representation may have been 
issued generally or specifically, but it must have created a 
specific and reasonable expectation in the investor. That is not 
to say that a subjective expectation will suffice; that 
subjective expectation must also have been objectively 
reasonable. As stated by the Saluka tribunal, “the scope of the 
Treaty’s protection of foreign investment against unfair and 
inequitable treatment cannot exclusively be determined by 
foreign investors’ subjective motivations and considerations. 
Their expectations, in order for them to be protected, must 
rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of 
the circumstances.”138  
138 = Saluka v. Czech Republic, ¶ 304.  
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Para 673 When the alleged legitimate expectation is one of regulatory 
stability, the reasonableness of the expectation must take into 
account the underlying presumption that, absent an assurance 
to the contrary, a state cannot be expected to freeze its laws 
and regulations. As noted by the Saluka tribunal, “[n]o 
investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally 
unchanged. In order to determine whether frustration of the 
foreign investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable, 
the host state’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate 
domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into 
consideration as well.”139  
139 = Saluka v. Czech Republic, ¶ 305.
Para 834 Similarly, the Waste Management II tribunal held that “[a] 
basic obligation of the State under Article 1105(1) [which sets 
out NAFTA’s minimum standard of treatment] is to act in 
good faith and form, and not deliberately to set out to destroy 
or frustrate the investment by improper means.”151  
151 = Waste Management v. Mexico II, 
¶ 138.  
! /!70 87
Teco Guatemala Holdings LLC versus The Republic of Guatemala, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/17, Award, 19 December 2013
P a r a 
454-455
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the minimum standard of 
FET under Article 10.5 of CAFTA-DR is infringed by conduct 
attributed to the State and harmful to the investor if the 
conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair or idiosyncratic, is 
discriminatory or involves a lack of due process leading to an 
outcome which offends judicial propriety.  
The Arbitral Tribunal agrees with the many arbitral 
tribunals433 and authorities434 that have confirmed that such 
is the content of the minimum standard of treatment in 
customary international law.  
433 = Waste Management Award, supra 
footnote 214, § 98; Glamis Gold Award, 
supra footnote 290, § 627.  
214 = Counter-Memorial, §§ 79-83 and 
Rejoinder, §§ 62 et seq. citing ADF 
Group Inc. v. United States of America, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/001, Award, 
January 9, 2003 (CL-4), § 190 
(hereinafter “ADF Award”), Robert 
Azinian et al. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/2), 
Award, November 1, 1999 (RL-2), § 99; 
Waste Management Inc. v. United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/3, Award, April 30, 2004 
(CL-46), § 12 (hereinafter “Waste 
M a n a g e m e n t Aw a r d ” ) ; S a l u k a 
Investments BV v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL Case, Partial Award, March 
17, 2006 (CL-42) (hereinafter “Saluka 
Award”), Generation Ukraine v. 
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, 
Award, September 16, 2003 (RL- 6) 
(hereinafter “Generation Ukraine 
Award”); EnCana Corporation v. 
Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN3481, (hereinafter “EnCana v. 
Ecuador”, Award, February 3, 2006 
(RL-9), § 194; Marvin Feldman v. 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/99/1, Final Award, December 
16, 2002 (RL-5), §§ 134, 140; GAMI 
Investments Inc. v. United Mexican 
States, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 
November 15, 2004 (RL-7), § 100; 
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic 
of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/
05/8, Award, September 11, 2007 
(RL-10) (hereinafter “Parkerings-
Compagniet Award”), §§ 315-317; 
Iberdrola Energía SA v. Republic of 
Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/5, 
Award, August 17, 2012 (RL-34) 
(hereinafter “Iberdrola Award”), §§ 
369-372 and 418-421.  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David Minnotte and Robert Lewis versus Republic of Poland, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/10/1, Award, 16 May 2014
Gold Reserve Inc. versus Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, 22 September 2014 
Para 198 The Claimants refer to the approach to the interpretation of 
the duty of fair and equitable treatment adopted by tribunals 
in cases such as Waste Management, Myers, Lauder, Saluka 
and TecMed.244 While the precise formulations of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard in these, and other, awards 
differ, they all have in common the notion that the State must 
be shown to have acted delinquently in some way or other if it 
is to be held to have violated that standard. It is not enough 
that a claimant should find itself in an unfortunate position as 
a result of all of its dealings with a respondent.  
244 = Waste Management, Inc. v. 
Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
00/3), Award, 30 April 2004, ¶ 98 
(“Waste Management”); S.D. Myers v. 
Canada, Partial Award, 13 November 
2000, ¶¶ 134 et seq.. (“Myers”); Lauder 
(US) v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 3 
September 2001 (“Lauder”); Saluka 
Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. 
The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 
March 2006, ¶¶ 298 & 309 (“Saluka”); 
Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, 
S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2), Award, 29 
May 2003, ¶ 154 (“Tecmed”); see also 
Claimants’ Memorial, ¶¶ 45-46, 56, 58, 
71; Claimants’ Reply Memorial, ¶ 155.  
Para 569 As held by the tribunal in Saluka, a foreign investor protected 
by the particular treaty providing for, among others, the FET 
standard, “may in any case properly expect that the [State 
will] implement[] its policies bona fide by conduct that is, as 
far as it affects the investors’ investment, reasonably 
justifiable by public policies and that such conduct does not 
manifestly violate the requirements of consistency, 
transparency, even- handedness and non-discrimination”. In 
particular, any differential treatment of a foreign investor must 
not be based on unreasonable distinctions and demands, and 
must be justified by showing that it bears a reasonable 
relationship to the foreign-owned investment.”461  
461 = Saluka, cit., paras. 307-308.  
Para 569 The tribunal held that the State had failed to accord the 
investor fair and equitable treatment because it failed to 
consider in an “unbiased, even-handed, transparent and 
consistent way” the investor’s good faith proposals to resolve 
the bank crisis, and by “unreasonably refus[ing] to 
communicate with IPB and Saluka/Nomura in an adequate 
manner.”462  
462 = Saluka, cit., para.  407.  
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Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd., Mobil 
Venezolana De Petróleos Holdings, Inc., Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd and 
Mobil Venezolana De Petróleos, Inc. versus The Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Award, 9 October 2014
Para 573 In Waste Management v. Mexico the tribunal summarized its 
position on the FET standard in the following terms:  
“the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable 
treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and 
harmful to Claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, 
unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes 
Claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of 
due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial 
propriety – as might be the case with a manifest failure of 
natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of 
transparency and candour in an administrative process. In 
applying this standard it is relevant that the treatment is in 
breach of representations made by the host State which were 
reasonably relied on by Claimant.”470  
470 = Waste Management v. Mexico, 
cit., para. 98.  
Para 256 The Tribunal will first consider the alleged breach of the FET 
standard. In the Tribunal’s opinion, this standard may be 
breached by frustrating the expectations that the investor may 
have legitimately taken into account when making the 
investment. Legitimate expectations may result from specific 
formal assurances given by the host state in order to induce 
investment330.  
330 = Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States 
(NAFTA Ch. 11, 8 June 2009), (Ex. 
CL-189); Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. 
Republic of Lithuania (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/8), (Ex. R-303); Continental 
Casualty Company v. Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9), 
(Ex. CL-167); Saluka Investments BV v. 
Czech Republic (PCA- UNCITRAL, IIC 
210 (2006)), (Ex. CL-123).  
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Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. versus 
Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, 10 March 2014
British Caribbean Bank Limited (Turks & Caicos) versus The Government 
of Belize, PCA CASE No 2010-18, Award, 19 December 2014 
Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. versus Republic of 
Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, 30 March 2015 
Para 401 The Tribunal concludes that Art 3(1) of the BIT is to be 
construed according to the ordinary meaning of the term “fair 
and equitable,” i.e., “‘just,’ ‘even-handed’, ‘unbiased’, 
‘legitimate’” and infringement of that standard requires 
“treatment in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the 
treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable”.
436 
436 = See Saluka Investments B.V. v. 
The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL 
(Partial Award dated 17 March 2006), 
para. 297 (Exhibit CLA-38).  
Para 279 First, fair and equitable treatment is frequently noted to 
include a prohibition on conduct that is “arbitrary,” 
“idiosyncratic,” or “discriminatory”.321 There is an inherent 
logic to this association.  
See, e.g., SD Myers Inc v Government 
of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award of 13 
November 2000 at para. 263; Waste 
Management, Inc v United Mexican 
States (No 2), ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/00/3, Award of 30 April 2004 
at para. 98.  
Para 604 Tribunals have tried to give meaning to the terms by 
circumscribing them with other terms such as ‘just’, ‘even-
handed’, ‘unbiased’, ‘legitimate’, ‘idiosyncratic’, ‘a manifest 
failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings’ and a 
disregard of ‘procedural propriety’.468  
468 = MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD 
Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 
2004, para. 113; Saluka Investments 
B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Partial Award, 17 March 2006, paras. 
303-308; Waste Management, Inc. v. 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, para. 98.  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P a r a 
609-610 
In Saluka v. Czech Republic, the tribunal found as follows:  
 
”The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of 
the Treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside the 
overall aim of encouraging foreign investment and extending 
and intensifying the parties’ economic relations. That in turn 
calls for a balanced approach to the interpretation of the 
Treaty’s substantive provisions for the protection of 
investments, since an interpretation which exaggerates the 
protection to be accorded to foreign investments may serve to 
dissuade States from admitting foreign investments and so 
undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying the 
parties’ mutual economic relations.  
Seen in this light, the “fair and equitable treatment” standard 
prescribed in the Treaty should therefore be understood to be 
treatment which, if not proactively stimulating the inflow of 
foreign investment capital, does at least not deter foreign 
capital by providing disincentives to foreign investors.”473  
In a first step to its assessment of the fair and equitable 
standard, and in light of the controversial debate among 
tribunals, the Tribunal affirms that the vagueness of the terms 
does not entitle tribunals to create a new standard of 
international law in disregard of the terms of the applicable 
treaties, generic as they may be.  
473 = Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
17 March 2006, paras. 300-301.  
Para 619 In Saluka v. Czech Republic, the tribunal affirmed:  
”No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally 
unchanged. In order to determine whether frustration of the 
foreign investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable, 
the host State’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate 
domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into 
consideration as well.”476  
476 = Saluka Investments, B.V. v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
17 March 2006, para. 305.  
Para 629 The Tribunal concurs with Saluka v. Czech Republic, where 
the Tribunal held that “expectations, in order to be protected, 
must rise to the level and reasonableness in light of the 
circumstances”.482  
482 = Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
17 March 2006, para. 304 (emphasis in 
original); also Waste Management, Inc. 
v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30 April 
2004, para. 99, and Pantechniki S.A. 
Contractors & Engineers v. Republic of 
Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, 
Award, 30 July 2009, paras. 81-82.  
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William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, 
Danial Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware, Inc. versus Government of 
Canada, UNCITRAL Rules, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 17 
March 2015
P a r a 
442-443
The formulation of the “general standard for Article 1105” by 
the Waste Management Tribunal is particularly influential, 
and a number of other tribunals have applied its formulation 
of the international minimum standard based on its reading of 
NAFTA authorities:  
 
”Taken together, the S.D. Myers, Mondev, ADF and Loewen 
cases suggest that the minimum standard of treatment of fair 
and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to 
the State and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is 
arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is 
discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial 
prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an 
outcome which offends judicial propriety - as might be the 
case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial 
proceedings or a complete lack of transparency and candour 
in an administrative process. In applying this standard it is 
relevant that the treatment is in breach of representations 
made by the host State which were reasonably relied on by the 
claimant.  
Evidently the standard is to some extent a flexible one which 
must be adapted to the circumstances of each case.”635  
While no single arbitral formulation can definitively and 
exhaustively capture the meaning of Article 1105, the 
Tribunal finds this quote from Waste Management to be a 
particularly apt one. Acts or omissions constituting a breach 
must be of a serious nature. The Waste Management 
formulation applies intensifying adjectives to certain items—
but by no means all of them—in its list of categories of 
potentially nonconforming conduct. The formulation includes 
“grossly” unfair, “manifest” failure of natural justice and 
“complete” lack of transparency.  
635 = Waste Management Inc. v. 
Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)00/3, 
30 April 2004, paras. 98 and 99, quoted 
in Mobil Investments Canada Inc. & 
Murphy Oil Corporation v. Canada, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/04, 
Decision on Liability and on Principles 
of Quantum, 22 May 2012, para. 141, 
and in Cargill Incorporated v. United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, 18 September 
2009, para. 282.  
! /!76 87
Supplement B  
Table of cases with corresponding treaties and FET formulations 
Case Name of Treaty Formulation of FET
V a n n e s s a 
Ve n t u re s L t d . 
v e r s u s T h e 
B o l i v a r i a n 
R e p u b l i c o f 
V e n e z u e l a , 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/6, 
A w a r d , 1 6 
January 2013.
Agreement between the 
Government of Canada 
and the Government of 
T h e R e p u b l i c o f 
Ve n e z u e l a f o r t h e 
P r o m o t i o n a n d 
P r o t e c t i o n o f 
Investments
Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the principles of 
international law, accord investments or returns of investors of the 
other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security. 
O a n M i c u l a , 
Viorel Micula, 
S.C. European 
Food S.A., S.C. 
Starmill S.R.L. 
a n d S . C . 
Multipack S.R.L. 
versus Romania, 
ICSID Case No. 
A R B / 0 5 / 2 0 , 
A w a r d , 1 1 
December 2013.
Agreement between the 
Government of Sweden 
and the Government of 
R o m a n i a o n t h e 
P r o m o t i o n a n d 
Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment
Each Contracting party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable 
treatment of the investments by investors of the other Contracting 
Party and shall not impair the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal thereof, as well as the acquisition of goods and 
services or the sale of their production, through unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures.  
The Rompetrol 
G r o u p N . V . 
versus Romania, 
ICSID Case No. 
A R B / 0 6 / 3 , 
Award, 6 May 
2013.
A g r e e m e n t o n 
encouragement and 
reciprocal protection of 
investments between 
the Government of the 
K i n g d o m o f t h e 
Netherlands and the 
G o v e r n m e n t o f 
Romania 
Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment of the 
investments of investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not 
impair, by unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the operation, 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by 
those investors. Each Contracting Party shall accord to such 
investments full physical security and protection.
Teco Guatemala 
Holdings LLC 
v e r s u s T h e 
R e p u b l i c o f 
G u a t e m a l a , 
ICSID  Case  No. 
A R B / 1 0 / 1 7 , 
Aw a r d ,  1 9 
December 2013.
T h e D o m i n i c a n 
R e p u b l i c - C e n t r a l 
America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-
DR)  
Article 10.5: Minimum Standard of Treatment  
1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in 
accordance with customary 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security. 
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the 
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. 
The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which 
is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive 
rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide: 
(a)  “fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny 
justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in 
accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal 
legal systems of the world; and  
(b)  “full protection and security” requires each Party to provide the 
level of police protection required under customary international law. 
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Anatolie Stati, 
Gabriel Stat i , 
A s c o m G ro u p 
S.A. and Terra 
R a f T r a n s 
Tra id ing L td . 
v e r s u s T h e 
R e p u b l i c o f 
Kazakhstan, SCC 
Arb i t ra t ion V 
( 1 1 6 / 2 0 1 0 ) , 
A w a r d , 1 9 
December 2013.
Energy Charter Treaty Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and 
transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to 
make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a 
commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of other 
Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments 
shall also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no 
Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall such Investments be accorded 
treatment less favourable than that required by international law, 
including treaty obligations. Each Contracting Party shall observe any 
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an 
Investor of any other Contracting Party. 
David Minnotte 
and Robert Lewis 
versus Republic 
of Poland, ICSID 
C a s e N o . 
ARB(AF)/10/1, 
Award, 16 May 
2014.
Treaty Between The 
U n i t e d S t a t e s O f 
A m e r i c a A n d T h e 
Republic Of Poland 
Concerning Business 
A n d E c o n o m i c 
Relations 
Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, 
shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be 
accorded treatment less than that required by international law. Neither 
Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory 
measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, 
acquisition, expansion or disposal of investments. Each Party shall 
observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
investments. 
Gold  Reserve 
Inc.  versus 
B o l i v a r i a n 
Republic  of 
V e n e z u e l a , 
ICSID  Case  No. 
ARB(AF)/09/1, 
Aw a r d ,  2 2 
September 2014.  
Agreement between the 
Government of Canada 
and the Government of 
t h e R e p u b l i c o f 
Ve n e z u e l a f o r t h e 
P r o m o t i o n a n d 
P r o t e c t i o n o f 
Investments 
Each Contracting Party shall encourage the creation of favourable 
conditions for investors of the other Contracting Party to make 
investments in its territory.  
Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the principles of 
international law, accord investments or returns of investors of the 
other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security.  
V e n e z u e l a 
Holdings, B.V., 
M o b i l C e r r o 
Negro Holding, 
L t d . , M o b i l 
Venezolana De 
P e t r ó l e o s 
Holdings, Inc., 
M o b i l C e r r o 
Negro, Ltd and 
M o b i l 
Venezolana De 
Petróleos, Inc. 
v e r s u s T h e 
B o l i v a r i a n 
R e p u b l i c o f 
V e n e z u e l a , 
ICSID Case No. 
A R B / 0 7 / 2 7 , 
A w a r d , 9 
October 2014. 
A g r e e m e n t o n 
encouragement and 
reciprocal protection of 
investments between 
the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the 
Republic of Venezuela 
Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment of the 
investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party and shall not 
impair, by arbitrary or discriminatory measures, the operation, 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by 
those nationals.  
More particularly, each Contracting Party shall accord to such 
investments full physical security and protection which in any case 
shall not be less than that accorded either to investments of its own 
nationals or to investments of nationals of any third State, whichever 
is more favourable to the national concerned.  
Case Name of Treaty Formulation of FET
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Tulip Real Estate 
Investment and 
D e v e l o p m e n t 
Netherlands B.V. 
versus Republic 
of Turkey, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/
11/28, Award, 10 
March 2014. 
A g r e e m e n t o n 
R e c i p r o c a l 
Encouragement and 
P r o t e c t i o n o f 
Investments between 
the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the 
Republic of Turkey 
Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to the 
investments of investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not 
impair, by unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the operation, 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment sale or liquidation thereof 
by those investors.  
B r i t i s h 
Caribbean Bank 
Limited (Turks & 
Caicos) versus 
The Government 
of Belize, PCA 
C A S E N o 
2010-18, Award, 
1 9 D e c e m b e r 
2014. 
Agreement between the 
Government of the 
United Kingdom of 
G r e a t B r i t a i n a n d 
Northern Ireland and 
the Government of 
B e l i z e f o r t h e 
P r o m o t i o n a n d 
P r o t e c t i o n o f 
Investments of 30 April 
1982  
Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable 
conditions for nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to 
invest capital in its territory, and, subject to its right to exercise powers 
conferred by its laws, and consistently with its national objectives, 
shall admit such capital.  
Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party 
shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall 
enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way impair 
by unreasonable, or discriminatory measures the management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory 
of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party. Each 
Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered 
into. with regard to investments of nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party.  
Hesham Talaat 
M. Al -Warraq 
v e r s u s T h e 
R e p u b l i c o f 
I n d o n e s i a , 
U N C I T R A L 
Rules, Award, 15 
December 2014.
A g r e e m e n t o n 
Promotion, Protection 
a n d G u a r a n t e e o f 
Investments among 
Member States of the 
Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference 
and  
Agreement between the 
Government of the 
United Kingdom of 
G r e a t B r i t a i n a n d 
Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
for the Promotion and 
P r o t e c t i o n o f 
Investments
Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party 
shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall 
enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that the 
management. maintenance use, enjoyment or disposal of investments 
in its territory of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party 
is not in any way impaired by unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures.
Hassan Awdi , 
E n t e r p r i s e 
B u s i n e s s 
Consultants, Inc. 
a n d A l f a E l 
C o r p o r a t i o n 
versus Romania, 
ICSID Case No. 
A R B / 1 0 / 1 3 , 
Award, 2 March 
2015 
Treaty between The 
Government of The 
U n i t e d S t a t e s O f 
A m e r i c a a n d T h e 
G o v e r n m e n t O f 
Romania Concerning 
t h e R e c i p r o c a l 
Encouragement and 
P r o t e c t i o n o f 
Investment 
2. (a) Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable 
treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case 
be accorded treatment less than that required by international law.  
(b) Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures the management, operation, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments. For 
purposes of dispute resolution under Articles VI and VII, a measure 
may be arbitrary or discriminatory notwithstanding the fact that a 
party has had or has exercised the opportunity to review such measure 
in the courts or administrative tribunals of a Party.  
Case Name of Treaty Formulation of FET
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Mamidoil Jetoil 
Greek Petroleum 
Products Societe 
S . A . v e r s u s 
R e p u b l i c o f 
Albania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/
11/24, Award, 30 
March 2015. 
  
B e t w e e n t h e 
Government of the 
Hellenic Republic and 
the Government of the 
Republic of Albania for 
the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments  
The BIT lacks a FET clause.  
Imported the ECT FET by the use of an MFN clause: 
Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and 
transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to 
make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a 
commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of other 
Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments 
shall also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no 
Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall such Investments be accorded 
treatment less favourable than that required by international law, 
including treaty obligations. Each Contracting Party shall observe any 
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an 
Investor of any other Contracting Party  
William Ralph 
Clayton, William 
Richard Clayton, 
Douglas Clayton, 
Danial Clayton 
and Bilcon of 
Delaware, Inc. 
v e r s u s 
Government of 
C a n a d a , 
U N C I T R A L 
Rules, Award on 
Jurisdiction and 
L i a b i l i t y, 1 7 
March 2015. 
North American Free 
Trade Agreement
Article 1105: Minimum Standard of Treatment  
1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security.  
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and notwithstanding Article 
1108(7)(b), each Party shall accord to investors of another Party, and 
to investments of investors of another Party, non-discriminatory 
treatment with respect to measures it adopts or maintains relating to 
losses suffered by investments in its territory owing to armed conflict 
or civil strife.  
3. Paragraph 2 does not apply to existing measures relating to 
subsidies or grants that would be inconsistent with Article 1102 but for 
Article 1108(7)(b).  
Case Name of Treaty Formulation of FET
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Supplement C  
Table of cases and corresponding UNCTAD study FET type and FET type used 
in this paper.  
* In the UNCTAD study, FET linked to international included the FET formulations ”FET in accordance with principles 
of international law” and ”FET NO LESS than required by international law or something”. Since there is no relevant 
different between ”no less than” and the unqualified FET I have chosen to put these in the same category, namely the 
category ”unqualified FET”.  
UNCTAD study FET categories  Corresponding FET category used in paper 
Unqualified FET Unqualified FET
FET linked to international law FET in accordance with principles of international law/
Unqualified FET*
FET linked to the international minimum standard under 
international customary law 
FET linked to the international minimum standard under 
international customary law 
FET with additional substantive content Unqualified FET
Case name UNCTAD study FET FET category used in 
paper
Vannessa Ventures Ltd. versus The Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
04/6, Award, 16 January 2013. 
FET linked to international law FET in accordance with 
principles of international law
Oan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food 
S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack 
S.R.L. versus Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/
05/20, Award, 11 December 2013.
FET with additional substantive 
content
Unqualified FET
The Rompetrol Group N.V. versus Romania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, 6 May 2013.
FET with additional substantive 
content
Unqualified FET
Teco Guatemala Holdings LLC versus The 
Republic of Guatemala,  ICSID  Case  No.  ARB/
10/17, Award, 19 December 2013.
FET linked to the international 
minimum standard under 
international customary law 
FET linked to the international 
minimum standard under 
international customary law 
Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group S.A. 
and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd. versus The 
Republic of Kazakhstan, SCC Arbitration V 
(116/2010), Award, 19 December 2013.
Unqualified FET Unqualified FET
David Minnotte and Robert Lewis versus Republic 
of Poland,  ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/10/1, 
Award, 16 May 2014.
FET linked to international law Unqualified FET
Gold Reserve Inc. versus Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela,  ICSID  Case  No.  ARB(AF)/09/1, 
Award, 22 September 2014.
FET linked to international law FET in accordance with 
principles of international law
Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro 
Holding, Ltd., Mobil Venezolana De Petróleos 
Holdings, Inc., Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd and Mobil 
Venezolana De Petróleos, Inc. versus The 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/27, Award, 9 October 2014.
FET with additional substantive 
content
Unqualified FET
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Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development 
Netherlands B.V. versus Republic of Turkey, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, 10 March 
2014.
FET with additional substantive 
content
Unqualified FET
British Caribbean Bank Limited (Turks & Caicos) 
versus The Government of Belize, PCA CASE No 
2010-18, Award, 19 December 2014.
Unqualified FET Unqualified FET
Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq versus The Republic 
of Indonesia, UNCITRAL Rules, Award, 15 
December 2014.
Unqualified FET Unqualified FET
Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, 
Inc. and Alfa El Corporation versus Romania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13, Award, 2 March 
2015.
FET linked to international law Unqualified FET
Mamidoil  Jetoil  Greek  Petroleum  Products 
Societe  S.A.  versus  Republic  of  Albania,  ICSID 
Case No. ARB/11/24, Award, 30 March 2015.
FET linked to international law Unqualified FET
William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, 
Douglas Clayton, Danial Clayton and Bilcon of 
Delaware, Inc. versus Government of Canada, 
UNCITRAL Rules, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Liability, 17 March 2015.
FET linked to the international 
minimum standard under 
international customary law 
FET linked to the international 
minimum standard under 
international customary law 
Case name UNCTAD study FET FET category used in 
paper
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